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ABSTRACT 
Jobs  created  by  small  businesses  represent  the  majority  of  employment  opportunities 
created  in  the  UK.    Efforts  to  reduce  long  term  unemployment  might  focus  on  the 
benefits of working closely with these businesses. 
 
The UK Government’s New Deal employment initiative, introduced in 1998, used wage 
subsidies to encourage the integration of the long term unemployed to the labour market. 
This  might  have  naturally  complemented  the  recruitment  needs  of  small  business, 
however, such businesses generally seek skills lacking in the long term unemployed. As 
such, the employment opportunities they create tend not to be accessed by this group.  
 
Small business use of employment interventions are undermined by the complex social 
and economic issues presented by the target group and the deeply rooted causal factors of 
unemployment that wage subsidies, alone, struggle to influence. 
 
Recognising the New Deal as the main labour market intervention of the last 10 years, its 
relationship with small businesses relied on a series of hopeful and naive assumptions in 
terms of candidate suitability and employer participation.  
 
Only  by  developing  intensive,  multidimensional,  complementary  and  long  term 
interventions can long term unemployment be tackled successfully as a partnership effort 
with small business.   Small Business Recruitment and the Unemployed  
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Introduction 
UK Government policy has long promoted a range of labour market interventions 
aimed at reintegrating the unemployed. As small businesses create most employment 
opportunities in the economy, a natural opportunity for a complementary relationship 
between these appears. However, tackling unemployment using the jobs created by 
small  business  may  be  a  difficult  process  to  establish  and  an  overly  simplistic 
solution to propose.  
 
The  vocational  skills  and  personal  qualities  of unemployed  candidates,  compared 
with the specific requirements of the small business employer, will challenge the 
effectiveness  of  labour  market  interventions  in  this  context.  The  complexities  of 
human  behaviour  and  the  unpredictability  of  the  commercial  environment  – 
especially  for  small  business  –  will  test  this  simplicity  and  viability  of  such  a 
complementary approach.  
 
The central issue for this dissertation is in determining the nature of this relationship 
and  to  discuss  the  factors  which  influence  small  business  employers  in  their 
cooperation with employment interventions. This is examined through a focus on the 
New Deal – introduced as a national employment programme in 1998 and premised 
on the inducement effect of wage subsidies.  
 
The main question here is: 
 
“In a complex policy and practice environment, can small business recruitment be 
positively influenced in favour of the unemployed ?” 
 
This  dissertation  establishes  the  economic  and  social  environment  in  which  such 
interventions  operate,  assesses  the  behavioural  traits  in  small  business  which 
determine  recruitment  decisions  and  reviews  employer  experiences  of  wage 
subsidies. Overall, this process seeks to demonstrate the limitations of a simple wage 
subsidy measure for the long term unemployed when used with the context of small 
business.  Small Business Recruitment and the Unemployed  
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Economic Origins 
Many labour market interventions derive from a belief that the most effective way of 
tackling  the  problem  of  long  term  structural  unemployment  is  to  make  the 
unemployed more attractive to employers – through help with motivation and job 
seeking, skills development and a flexible system of wage differentials.  
 
Layard (1994) states that individuals in long-term unemployment reduce the quantity 
of available labour, which in turn increases wage costs leading to reduced labour 
demand and increased unemployment. In such a scenario employment interventions 
can  reduce  long  term  unemployment,  increase  the  scale  and  depth  of  the  labour 
market,  improve  the  quality  of  labour  supply  without  increasing  wage  costs, 
stimulate labour demand and permanently counter long term unemployment. This 
will help prevent development of long term unemployment, over time contributing to 
a reduction in the overall incidence of this.  
 
Supply  side  strategies,  such  as  the  New  Deal,    concentrate  assistance  measures 
towards the long term unemployed and away from the short term unemployed. The 
aim  of  this  is  to  advantage  the  former  -the  latter  being  better  equipped  to  find 
employment from their own efforts with more than 80 per cent of this short term 
group, finding alternative employment within six months of becoming unemployed 
(Campbell 2000).  
 
Layard (1994) asserts that in this approach, job substitution does not present as a 
problem because as the long term unemployed move into employment, the short term 
unemployed will remain generally more employable and as the economy grows, will 
find jobs more easily - reducing the ‘natural’ rate of unemployment in the labour 
market.  This  helps  to  make  the  unemployed  more  employable,  reduces  wage 
pressures  in  the  economy  and  allows  for  higher  levels  of  overall  output  without 
creating inflationary pressures. 
 
 Small Business Recruitment and the Unemployed  
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Making the Unemployed Employable  
In the New Deal the stress is upon the improvement of employability of the long 
term  unemployed  rather  than  on  job  creation.  Employability  is  to  be  achieved 
through skills training, labour market flexibility and by strengthening personal, social 
and  economic  networks.  At  the  core  of  this  are  the  four  main  components  of 
employability introduced by Hillage and Pollard (1999) as  
 
1.  Assets  - The personal and economic qualities possessed by the typical New 
Deal referral 
2.  Deployment - The characteristics of the local labour markets where New Deal 
will operate 
3.  Presentation  -  The  manner  in  which  the  New  Deal  managing  agent 
(Employment Service) presents the New Deal candidate to the employer. 
4.  Circumstances  -  The  enduring  nature  of  reservation  wages,  benefits 
dependency and social impediments to labour market access. 
 
The New Deal model seeks to combine employment and welfare policy in a manner 
commonly referred to as ‘active labour market policy’. This is based on the two 
broad  approaches  of  training  and  job  creation  schemes,  alongside    employment 
subsidies supported by coercion through withdrawal of welfare entitlement (Nathan 
2001;Campbell 2000; Meager and Metcalf 1987).   
 
New Deal is effectively an individually focussed, supply side approach to national 
training  policy  (Campbell  2000;  Hasluck  1999a;  Tongue  1999).  It  has  been 
developed as a long-term programme, which seeks to fundamentally address the way 
in which Government policy addresses the issue of unemployment. It is an attempt to 
redefine the interface between the welfare state and the individual; displacing the 
post war benefits system with an employment focussed  alternative i.e. a positive  
engagement in occupational activity linked to a financial incentive as opposed to 
economic inactivity and benefits dependency (Gregg 1999; Peck 1998; Corry 1998; 
Evans  Millar  and  Sayre.  1997;  Finn  1997).  This  is  in  contrast  to  the  dominant 
‘universal social welfare’ based model of the post war years, designed to provide 
interim welfare support for those experiencing periods of unemployment but Small Business Recruitment and the Unemployed  
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stretched by social and economic changes which have burdened the model with long 
term  structural  demands  it  was  never  designed  to  deal  with  (Green  1998a,  Finn 
1997). 
 
Enduring Unemployment  
New  Deal  will  concentrate  in  areas  experiencing  high  rates  of  long-term 
unemployment. These tends towards clusters of certain community types across the 
UK – predominantly ex-industrial (Peck 1998; Clark and Leyard 1997)– and that 
from this long term unemployment becomes a geographic, cultural as well as a social 
and economic issue (Turok and Webster 1998; Layard 1994). This is evidenced not 
only by comparatively high rates of unemployment, but within this, as Green (1998b) 
notes, high rates of long term unemployment.  
 
At its inception, more than half the target group for New Deal was concentrated in 18 
of  the  UK’s  471  local  authorities  (Peck  1998)    -  mostly  large  city  areas  in  ex-
industrial regions such as Tyneside, Clydeside, Merseyside and South Wales. This 
introduces  a  spatial  aspect  to  the  implementation  of  the  New  Deal  (Turok  and 
Webster  1998;  Green  1998b;  Fothergill  2001).  Here  there  are  high  incidences  of 
individuals whose vocational qualities employers find unattractive i.e. basic skills 
deficiencies  and  complex  social  and  economic  circumstances.  This  does  little  to 
encourage economic activity, which impacts on the viability of the local economy, in 
turn making it difficult to support sustainable economic activity and employment 
generating businesses.  
 
Weak labour supply does not encourage business activity, leading in turn to weak 
demand (Fothergill 2001;Lee 1999; Barkham et al. 1996;Brown and Sessions 1996; 
Fielder 1992;Green 1998b; Vassen and Keeble 1995). This is inevitably bound in 
with  labour  quality  issues  which  conspire  to  reinforce  this  experience  (Campbell 
2000; Smith 2000; Lee 1999). 
 
 This set of problems can be summarised as the variable geography of labour demand 
(Green 1998a; Peck 1998). In effect, the poorest areas are expected to absorb the 
most labour. It is also the case that in these areas the lowest quality types of jobs Small Business Recruitment and the Unemployed  
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dominate e.g. poor pay and terms and conditions of work. This further undermines 
the ambitions of the New Deal approach by concentrating effort in those areas least 
able to support it aims (Campbell 2000; Brown and Sessions 1996). It follows from 
this  that  a  general  application  of  a  New  Deal  approach  will  prepare  people  for 
employment in areas which have limited employment opportunities (Pugh 1998).  
 
The difficult social and economic circumstances evident at the area level, the relative 
disengagement of the target group from the social and economic mainstream and the 
inherent weaknesses in the local business base may prove to be complicating factors. 
This  introduces  an  institutional  effect  at  the  local  level  where  pure  market 
approaches  addressing  supply  and  demand  are  weak  and  the  limits  of  economic 
determinism become evident.  
 
New Deal does not take sufficient account of the demand side structural causes of 
unemployment  –  a  fact  that  Layard  (1998)  states  will  be  most  difficult  in  those 
demand  deficient  parts  of  the  country  where  the  need  is  greatest.  In  New  Deal 
demand  is  assumed,  supply  is  asserted.  A  market-based,  employer  dependent 
approach  using  the  welfare  system  to  compensate  for  these  problems  appears 
ambitious.  
 
Previous  attempts  at  introducing  predominantly  supply  based  labour  market 
programmes  have  experienced  limited  or  temporary  effects  because,  as  simple 
jobs/employment  or  ‘work-first’    based  approaches,  they  have  been  unable  to 
account for the many social, economic, cultural and personal factors at play. This is 
evidenced by the persistence of unemployment and poverty as key characteristics of 
community life in many disadvantaged areas despite repeated interventions. (Green 
1998b; Brown and Sessions 1996). 
 
Green (1998b) finds that a spatial  concentration of poverty, together with the failure 
to  adequately  address  this  in  the  past,  has  directly  led  to  underdeveloped  access 
routes to employment opportunities, and poor flows of employment information i.e. 
‘word of mouth’ employment  opportunity. Alongside this, employer’s perceptions 
of poor quality business environments, underdeveloped services and issues of labour Small Business Recruitment and the Unemployed  
 
  7 
quality make these areas unattractive to business investment. Finally, the aggregate 
income from multiple, interdependent welfare benefits can make the transition to 
paid  employment  of  marginal  (and  sometimes  negative)  gain.  Here  a  culture  of 
unemployment  develops  where  personal  attitudes  and    preferences  may  prove 
resistant to employment and unattractive to employers.  
 
The interplay of these factors means that possible solutions in addressing elements of 
unemployment must be sensitive to, and try to account for, its complex causal factors 
and  enduring  nature.  The  individual  choices  which  affect  the  transition  from 
economic  inactivity  to  employment  are  complicated  and  the  factors  which  will 
influence the success of such a transition are equally so. The processes of the New 
Deal will be rigorously tested in the operational environment.  
 
Quality of Labour 
Qualitative  research  with  individuals  (Leggard  et  al.  2000)  and  case  studies  of 
delivery (Tavistock  Institute 1999) identified  a  wide range of specific  barriers to 
employment faced by New Deal clients on all programmes.  
 
Hasluck 1999; Fothergill 2001; Atkinson, Giles and Meager. 1998 and Green 1998c 
summarise these as economic, social and personal. Unemployed individuals entering 
the New Deal tend to have weak or out of date vocational skills and work experience, 
a reliance on welfare benefits and the personal and social issues which develop along 
side  unemployment.  At  its  early  stages,  around  a  third  of  New  Deal  for  Young 
People  and  half  of  those  on  New  Deal  for  the  Long  Term  Unemployed  held  no 
academic qualification. Of those qualifications held, the great majority were at VQ 1 
and 2, or equivalent (Hasluck 2000).   
 
The most conspicuous characteristic of the New Deal client group is that they lack 
work experience. Almost 30 per cent have never had a job whilst a further 40 per 
cent have been mainly unemployed (Hasluck 1998). Moreover, virtually 80 per cent 
of those with work experience had previously worked in just three sectors Catering 
(31per cent) manufacturing (29per cent) and construction (19per cent) Small Business Recruitment and the Unemployed  
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This  unemployment  and  long-term  unemployment  fosters  a  decay  effect  on  an 
individual’s readiness for employment and training. After six months unemployment 
the chances of someone finding work in any given week have fallen to less than 1 in 
50, and thereafter still fall further (McQuaid 2002) 
 
Strong  social  trends  are  evident  across  the  target  groups  much  of  which  is 
attributable to a concentration of long-term unemployment in poorer social classes 
previously  dependent  on  declining  sectors  such  as  heavy  industry.  Within  such 
communities  cultures  of  low  opportunity,  low  expectation,  generational 
unemployment  and  benefits  dependency  prevail.  Sub  groups  within  this  identify 
ethnic  background,  the  older  unemployed  and  young  males  as  of  particular 
disadvantage. At the time of its introduction, the New Deal target groups were almost 
predominantly male (70 per cent of entrants). In the New Deal for the Long Term 
Unemployed, this increases to 84 per cent (Hasluck 2000). 
 
Factors frequently affecting the employment prospects of the New Deal target group 
relate to motivation to work, confidence, loss of benefits in the transition to work, 
caring  commitments,  access  to  labour  market  information,  transport  difficulties, 
personal health and lifestyle.  
 
 
How the New Deal Might Help Small Business 
The  design  of  the  New  Deal  model  assumed  that  small  business  might  benefit 
through a flow of potential employees who brought with them a wage subsidy and a 
training allowance. Given that these individuals were to be sourced from the long 
term unemployed, it was accepted that they might require additional time and support 
to  settle  in  the  workplace.  To  assist  this,  the  Employment  Service  would  make 
available a named contact serving both the employer and the employee to provide the 
initial  job  matching  service  alongside  continuing  support  and  guidance,  allowing 
both to adjust to this new situation. 
 
It was accepted that the new employee would take time to’ get up to speed’. To 
compensate for this, the New Deal wage subsidy would reduce the employer wage Small Business Recruitment and the Unemployed  
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costs for the first six months of placement. In addition, it was also expected that the 
employee and employer would work together to ensure that appropriate vocational 
training  was  undertaken  as  part  of  this  relationship.  This  relationship  would  be 
facilitated  by  the  New  Deal  Personal  Adviser.  After  this  six  months  New  Deal 
placement, there was an expectation that if the employee had proved their worth and 
if the employer could afford to, a permanent employment position would result. 
 
In a small business the introduction of a New Deal employee might help to provide 
additional labour at an especially busy time, release a member of staff to vocational 
training and increase the overall capacity of the business 
 
In financial terms, the New Deal employee would also introduce a £60 per week 
contribution to their own wages as well as an accompanying training allowance for 
use in developing accredited job specific skills. Over the 26 weeks of New Deal this 
would save the business £1560 in salary costs or provide £1560 worth of free labour.  
More realistically it was likely to present a situation somewhere in the middle where 
the management costs, business inconvenience and lower productivity of the New 
Deal employee would present as a sum benefit somewhat less than this. In a business 
context of the immediate need for staff and the protection of the business function, 
this may then become a very marginal benefit.  
 
Small Business Recruitment and the New Deal  
45  per  cent  of  private  employment  in  the  UK  is  found  in  small  business.  The 
majority of jobs growth in the UK economy occurs in the small business sector and 
within this, a small sub-set of businesses (5-10 per cent) who together account for 
around 40-50 per cent of the employment created (Storey 1998). The small business 
is a significant creator of employment opportunities and as such should be viewed as 
a natural target area for the New Deal to engage with. 
 
New  Deal  should  be  able  to  improve  the  quality  of  labour  supply  to  enhance 
employment prospects. Small businesses offer the greatest number of opportunities 
but the skills and qualities on offer from the unemployed must prove sufficiently Small Business Recruitment and the Unemployed  
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attractive for recruitment to occur. Involving the private sector as key players and 
equal partners in this effort will be  a critical success factor. 
 
Employers offering entry-level employment are principally interested in core skills 
and attributes such as attitude, reliability, motivation and literacy/numeracy (Hasluck 
2000; Hasluck 1998). These are often referred to as employability skills, commonly 
observed as lacking in the long term unemployed  
 
At its inception, New Deal was marketed very strongly at the employer community, 
especially  small  business  employers  (Campbell  2000;  Joseph  2000;Convery 
1999;Finn 1999;Corry 1998). It was launched with an appeal to small business to 
honour a social commitment whilst benefiting from an improved quality  of local 
labour supply. This call to community and social responsibility is not just about the 
recruitment  needs  of  small  business  but  about  including  the  unemployed  in  the 
community mainstream. Confusingly, little effort was made to explain this or involve 
small business in the initial design of the New Deal model (Finn 2001). 
 
Recruitment 
New Deal appears as a micro level intervention, driven by the needs of the individual 
long-term unemployed  and paying little attention to the stated preferences of the 
employer community (Green 1998; Willets 1998; Evans 1996). By its design, New 
Deal  relies  heavily  on  individual  responsibility  on  the  part  of  the  long-term 
unemployed and voluntary commitment from the business community. It offered no 
acknowledgement  of  related  business  interventions  favoured  by  the  business 
community  and  at  a  structural  level,  there  appeared  too  little  recognition  of  the 
potential positive influence that the small business community could have had in 
shaping its approach.  
 
Within New Deal, there appears to be no associated strategy concerning demand 
stimulation and the creation of new additional jobs for this purpose. The opportunity 
to link the recruitment priorities of small businesses with the aims of New Deal has 
not happened and its design has not been influenced by the advice of employers 
(Finn 2001; Mason 1998). This approach intended to engage employers in the New Small Business Recruitment and the Unemployed  
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Deal process seems to be built on a presumption of good intent and spare capacity 
(Beatty and Fothergill 1998; Green 1998; Peck 1998). 
 
The health of a business is likely to be strongly linked to the quality of its staff which 
in turn is related to the strengths of its recruitment process (Atkinson, Giles and 
Meager 1996; Fielder 1992,). The critical success factors in the relationship between 
the New Deal initiative and the recruitment needs of the small business is likely to 
found  here.  This  may  be  regarded  as  the  ‘meeting  point’  of  greatest  potential  in 
bringing supply and demand labour market issues together in New Deal (Campbell 
2000;  Hasluck 1999; Nye 1998).  
 
Interventions: Strengths and Limitations  
New Deal is founded on the use of wage subsidies as an inducement to employer 
involvement, yet these appear unattractive to the business community. In the 1970s 
employment subsidies were seen as an appropriate response to the major changes in 
employment that were taking place in the main UK labour markets, especially the 
major job losses occurring in manufacturing. Employment subsidy programmes were 
implemented on a national scale and were designed to encourage job preservation, 
retention and slow down the rate of job loss (Campbell 2000; Snape 1998; McKay 
1997). By the late 1970s and early 1980s, employment subsidy programmes had 
become  more  sharply  targeted,  normally  on  the  long-term  unemployed  but 
sometimes on other target groups such as young people.  
 
The following table outlines the variety of wage subsidy approaches undertaken over 
this time in the UK of which the New Deal Employer option is but the latest. 
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Table 1.1 Previous Employment Subsidy Measures in the UK  
 
Programme  Period  Target Group  Subsidy 
Recruitment Subsidy for School 
Leavers 
75-76  School leavers  £5pw for 26 weeks 
Temporary  Employment 
Subsidy 
75-79  Potentially  redundant 
employees 
£20 pw for 52 weeks 
Youth Employment Subsidy  76-78  Young  People  ,<20, 
unemployed for 6 months 
£10 pw for 26 weeks 
Small  Firms  Employment 
Subsidy 
1978  New  Recruits  to  Small 
Firms 
£20 pw for 26 weeks 
Temporary  Short  Time 
Working Compensation 
79-84  Potentially  Redundant 
Employees 
75%  of  normal  wage  for 
days not worked 
Adult Employment Subsidy  78-79  Long Term Unemployed  £20pw for 26 weeks 
Young Worker Scheme  82-86  16-17  year  olds  taking 
low paid jobs 
£15 pw for 52 weeks 
New Worker Scheme  86-88  18-20  year  olds  taking 
low paid jobs 
£15 pw for 52 weeks 
Enterprise Allowance Scheme  82-91  Unemployed  people  into 
self employment 
£40 pw for 52 weeks 
Training  and  Employment 
Grants Scheme 
89-92  Long  term  unemployed 
in Scotland 
50%  wage  +  100% 
training  costs  for  26 
weeks 
Worktrials  1989  Unemployed trying out a 
job 
Remain on benefits of 13 
weeks 
Business Start Up Scheme  91-95  Unemployed  people  into 
self employment 
Varied  from  TEC  /LEC 
area 
Workstart  1 
Workstart 2 
Workstart 3 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Very  long  term 
unemployed 
 
WS1 £2340 
WS2 £700/2800/ 
WS3 £1000 
NI Contributions Holiday  1996  Very  long  term 
unemployed 
Employers  NI  for  12 
months 
(Hasluck 1999) 
 
Participation in these wage subsidy programmes was voluntary. 
 
Storey  (1998)  reports  that  despite  a  design  which  has  deliberately  sought  to 
encourage  employer  use,  such  initiatives  remained  stubbornly  unattractive  to  the 
business community, evidenced through low rates of uptake, employer enthusiasm 
and satisfaction. Hasluck (1999, 2000) reports that employer scepticism regarding 
the  effectiveness of these grants generates resistance to their use. Even where they 
have  been  used,  they  have  contributed  little  in  the  way  of  additional  sustainable 
employment with most employers using them to reduce wage costs or pre screen 
employees  - producing a strong  displacement and deadweight effect with limited 
additional employment.  Small Business Recruitment and the Unemployed  
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Table 1.2 Subsidy Programme:  Impact Summary 
 
Recruitment Subsidy for School Leavers  Approx. 15% additionality  
 
Youth Employment Subsidy  5% additionality 
Small Firms Employment Subsidy  Employment in participation firms increased by 
20%  –  however  employment  in  non-
participating  firms  increased  12%.  Based  on 
these  figures  deadweight  appears  as  60%  and 
gross additionality 40% 
Temporary Short Time Working Compensation  High  deadweight  effect  (61%)  1975–79  8800 
applications  covering  540000  jobs.  Jobs  saved 
were in declining sectors. TSTWC delayed the 
inevitable 
Adult Employment Subsidy  Did not proceed beyond pilot stage due to poor 
employer take up. 5% additionality 
Young Worker Scheme  16% additionality  
Training and Employment Grants Scheme  Rule that jobs must be additional – deadweight 
of 16% 
Additionality 27% 
Workstart 1-3   Deadweight 48-85% 
Additionality 11-19%  
National Insurance Contributions ‘Holiday’  Participation  as  voluntary,  take  up  rates  very 
small- low take up attributed to lack of employer 
awareness 
Hasluck (2000) 
 
Overall these programmes appear as bonus payment for recruitment that would have 
occurred anyway across an employer community whose actions are more likely to be 
influenced  by  a  whole  host  of  other,  more  immediate,  business  factors  than  the 
simple availability of subsidised labour (Hasluck 2000; Meager and Metcalf 1997). 
 
Despite a range of different approaches, wage subsidies show only limited impact in 
reintegrating  the  most  difficult  target  groups  to  the  labour  market  (Meager  and 
Metcalf  1998).  Hasluck  (1999)  suggests  that  the  use  of  an  employment  subsidy 
implies that the heart of the problem is low candidate productivity on the part of the 
new  subsidised  recruit  and  the  inability  of  the  employers  to  sustain  a  marginal 
increase  in  the  workforce  through  purely  commercial  effort.  No  single  approach 
appears to have captured the imagination of the employers and established itself as a 
regular feature of employer activity. 
 
The introduction of wage subsidies in the New Deal does not appear to be based on 
solid  positive  experience  of  previous  initiatives.  Small  businesses  have  a  limited Small Business Recruitment and the Unemployed  
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history  of  involvement  with  and  use  of  Government  sponsored  employment 
initiatives. In particular, and of specific interest in the case of the New Deal, there 
appears to be a general lack of interest in such grant mechanisms aimed at bringing 
the  previously  unemployed  back  in  to  the  labour  market  (Hasluck  1999,  2000, 
2001;Campbell 2000;Meager and Metcalf 1998;Theodore 1998).   
 
The key features emerging from this analysis are the limited additional impact that 
such  initiatives  can  bring  to  the  labour  market.  The  typical  experiences  of  these 
programmes can collectively be regarded as having produced low rates of additional 
employment,  limited  gains  in  employer  involvement,  deadweight  as  a  significant 
issue and low sustainability.  
 
 
Inducing Employer Involvement 
The most obvious impediment to employer enthusiasm in using wage subsidies will 
be the job readiness of the potential employee given their period of absence from the 
labour market. Employment skills atrophy quickly and employers tend to regard this 
as a general trend in the unemployed, applying a homogeneous understanding to this 
despite the diversity of this cohort.  
 
There appears to be a general perception in the employer community that recruiting a 
previously  unemployed  individual,  entails  the  consideration  of  additional  factors 
beyond those when employing a previously employed individual. It is reasonable to 
infer that where New Deal seeks to encourage the employment of the previously 
unemployed these issues will arise. Particular sub groups of the unemployed fare 
even worse with many employers stating a strong aversion to employing those with a 
criminal  record,  language  difficulties  or  a  history  of  mental  health  difficulties             
(Metcalf  2000).  The  Federation  of  Small  Business  report  a  considerable  issue  of 
literacy and numeracy difficulties when recruiting from such groups with over 50 per 
cent of employers identifying some problems (FSB 2000).  
 
In  addition  to  this  where  the  unemployed  are  recruited  they  tend  to  feature  as 
employees  at  the  more  vulnerable  end  of  the  labour  market.  They  are  recruited Small Business Recruitment and the Unemployed  
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disproportionately into insecure, low paid employment (Dickens 2001;Peck 2000; 
Theodore 1998; Strawn 1998; Hasluck et al. 1996) and lack the personal coping 
strategies and access to personal networks to prevent against an entry/exit pattern of 
labour market engagement. 
 
The main difficulty which will arise in the operation of the New Deal will centre on 
the specific requirements of the small business employer and the inadequate quality 
of labour presented by the New Deal for this. Even where employers are able to 
manage this, further complications will be generated when recruiting through the 
New Deal; in administrative and management issues, training requirements and the 
perception  of  insignificant,  or  negative,    business  benefit  for  the  effort  and  time 
invested. The financial inducement offered will not be strong enough to offset the 
business and risk and commercial liabilities raised when recruiting through the New 
Deal.  
 
Small business recruitment practices will not be influenced by the New Deal model. 
Their core purpose is to sustain business function and generate trading surpluses. 
Distractions from this can prove costly in an environment of tight margins and strong 
competition. In a competitive business environment where day to day issues might 
mean  the  difference  between  viability,  survival  and  failure,  this  ability  to  plan 
activity in strategic social terms becomes a little stretched. Here there is a conflict 
between the principle and the reality of New Deal.  
 
New Deal may appear as a continuation of misplaced interventions which have failed 
to account for the stated needs of small business (King and Wickham Jones 1997) . 
Where the New Deal focuses on its main target as the unemployed individual, this 
understates the needs of the business as an employer. Whilst the overall drive of New 
Deal  has  been  in  its  aims  to  promote  employability,  employers  expect  that  this 
approach  should  become  more  sensitive  to  their  needs  (Hasluck  2000;Griffiths 
1999;Evans, Nathan and Simmons 1997;Hasluck 1999; Meager and Metcalf 1987). 
 
It  is  perhaps  telling  that  those  who  best  understand  the  needs  of  the  employing 
organisation  (the  employer)  appear  to  be  consulted  least  about  how  to  work Small Business Recruitment and the Unemployed  
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successfully  with  support  agencies  in  improving  job  prospects  for  the  long  term 
unemployed. This is especially evident in the case of small business. In this context, 
the final success of any employment intervention will be strongly determined by how 
employers are successfully incentivised to participate. 
 
The Changing Labour Market 1998-2006  
Since the introduction of the New Deal in 1998, it has continued its work in an 
evolving social, economic and political context. Changes in the labour market over 
this time have led to the lowest national levels of recorded unemployment in over 40 
years, with many parts of the country able to claim full employment.  
 
Businesses operating in this tightening labour market may have been able to use 
wage subsidies to offset the costs of additional general employment, reduce the costs 
of existing employees and help manage the risk associated with recruiting from the 
long term unemployed.  
 
In broad terms, this tightening labour market, would suggest that employers may be 
more inclined to consider employing the long term unemployed because of labour 
shortage and the value  of New  Deal in easing  this process. These strong market 
conditions are reported as conducive to the success of large-scale welfare to work 
programmes,  similar  to  the  New  Deal  (Nathan  2001;Peck1998;  Robinson  1998) 
where such programmes are highly dependent on prevailing macro-economic trends. 
Given  the  positive  trends  evident  around  the  introduction  of  the  New  Deal,  the 
economic environment should be supportive of its aims.  However it remains likely 
that the fundamental difficulties raised when small businesses attempt to recruit the 
unemployed through structured labour market interventions will limit the anticipated 
New Deal effect.  
 
Dissertation Structure and Method 
This dissertation will examine the limits of the small business as a suitable employer 
host to the long term unemployed. It is constructed around six main chapters based 
on the following structure. 
 Small Business Recruitment and the Unemployed  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The key questions addressed in this chapter include: 
•  What is the political, social and economic context in which the reduction of 
long term unemployment is attempted? 
•  What are the central objectives of the New Deal approach? 
•  What issues may arise when a major intervention of this type is used with 
small businesses? 
•  Dissertation structure 
 
Chapter 2   Method 
The main empirical base for this dissertation was a programme of  field research 
undertaken by way of a three-point questionnaire conducted over an 18-month period 
between  1998  and  2000.  360  small  private  businesses  from  6  New  Deal 
administrative delivery partnership areas across the UK formed this. Further in-depth 
case study interviews were undertaken with a further 27 businesses selected from this 
group.  Information  collated  through  is  interpreted  to  provide  an  account  of  the 
experiences of this employer group when working at the early stages if the New 
Deal. 
 
Chapter 3  Employment Outcomes and Business Benefits  
This chapter introduces this empirical research evidence and discusses the nature of 
the relationship between the recruitment behaviour of the small businesses and the 
impact that the New Deal has been observed to have on this. It  assesses the impact 
of  the  New  Deal  as  a  wage  subsidy  approach,  interpreting  employer  use  of  this 
against the effect  anticipated at the introduction of a wage subsidy. Key questions 
include 
•  How do small businesses typically recruit and does this fit with the New Deal 
model?  
•  How well does the New Deal account for the sensitivities of small business 
recruitment? 
•  What type and quality of employment is produced by the New Deal? Small Business Recruitment and the Unemployed  
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•  How  do  employers  view  the  employment  of  the  long  term  unemployed 
through New Deal? 
•  How  has  the  New  Deal  affected  the  recruitment  practices  of  the  small 
business? 
•  What benefits has New Deal participation brought to the small business? 
 
Chapter 4 Working with the New Deal 
This chapter examines the underlying reasons affecting the participation of small 
business in the New Deal and sets out to determine the key design and operational 
factors  which  have  determined  this.  It  draws  further  on  the  employer  survey, 
interpreting this and outlining the reasons for the observed issues arising in the use of 
New Deal. Key Questions include 
•  What did employers expect to gain from New Deal and what happened in 
reality? 
•  What benefits did small business employers experience through participation 
in the New Deal? 
•  Did  small  businesses  change  its  recruitment  methods  to  accommodate  the 
complexities of the New Deal? 
•  How  the  New  Deal  has  failed  to  capitalise  on  strong,  favourable  labour 
market conditions? 
•  Is a wage subsidy a realistic form of inducement? 
 
 
Chapter 5  Effective Intervention 
This chapter accounts for the limited additional employment created during the New 
Deal period and discusses how the characteristics of the long term unemployed and 
the limitations of the labour market interventions conspired to limit overall effect. 
The key questions here are  
•  What have been the main limitations of the New Deal and how have these 
been addressed in successor interventions? 
•  What issues of labour market policy and practice are raised by this? 
•  What related factors should complement an employment based strategy?  Small Business Recruitment and the Unemployed  
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•  What  can  we  learn  from  the  New  Deal  in  terms  of  encouraging 
employment,  supporting  small  business  and  attaining  employment 
outcomes? 
 
Chapter 6 Conclusions and Recommendations 
This  chapter  builds  from  the  positive  developments  identified  as  essential  to  the 
successful reintegration of the long term unemployed and suggests how these can be 
developed across future interventions to more fully appreciate the needs of the small 
business employer. The key points here are;  
•  What can we learn from the experiences of the New Deal? 
•  How can we  develop positive employment pathways for the 
unemployed? 
•  How do we include employers as full partners in this ? 
 Method 
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Introduction 
The primary research, aimed at developing a fuller understanding of the New Deal 
approach with small business employers, was based on business survey structured as 
a  three-part  questionnaire  supplemented  by  case  study  follow  up.  The  areas  and 
companies  involved  in  this  were  selected  for  their  capacity  to  offer  a  general 
reflection of the economic and social circumstances against which New Deal was 
intended  to  stimulate  local  labour  supply  i.e.  areas  in  economic  decline  with 
corresponding levels of high unemployment.  
 
The Survey  
The survey sought to elicit the views of typical small business employers with regard 
to the introduction of the New Deal and in particular the key issues of recruitment 
and employment growth. This was conducted across six key areas of the UK. 60 
private  small  businesses  from  each  of  the  six  locations  were  identified  with  the 
assistance  of  the  local  New  Deal  Partnership  and  the  local  Employment  Service 
District Office – responsible for the national administration of New Deal at the local 
level.  
 
The Employment Service has a national presence in the main centres of population 
across  the  UK.  It  is  organised  into  regional  units  of  delivery,  of  which  at  the 
inception of the New Deal, there were 144.  These units formed the basis of New 
Deal  delivery.  At  this  level,  local  consortia  were  set  in  place  to  implement  the 
approach in each unit area. Ostensibly, this was to encourage a greater degree of 
representative and co-operative working, however as in the vast majority of cases the 
Employment Service were also the principal service provider, it may be considered 
that  the  New  Deal  in  many  respects  became  synonymous  with  the  Employment 
Service.  Since  the  establishment  of  the  New  Deal  the  Employment  Service  has 
reorganised as the Jobcentreplus and continues to act as the principal national public 
sector employment placing network.  
 
Along with the Employment Service the delivery partnerships formed for the New 
Deal typically included representation from the local authority, the local enterprise Method 
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network  (LEC/TEC), local Chamber of Commerce/local employers, the voluntary 
sector, Careers Service, FE College, Trades Unions and local elected representatives.  
 
Of the companies participating in the survey, all were confirmed as likely to engage 
with the New Deal as employers. These employers were previously uninterested in 
such employment subsidy programmes but had developed an early positive attitude 
to  these  through  the  promotion  of  the  New  Deal.  The  survey  did  not  include 
companies  whose  previous  use  of  grants  was  unknown  or  who  had  a  previous 
experience of these and who did not choose to work with the New Deal. 
 
Fieldwork  
The main survey objectives were to 
 
•  Identify key activities and trends in these small businesses by baseline and 
follow up interview 
•  Identify  key  issues  of  recruitment,  employment  growth  and  business 
development  
•  Establish  existing  patterns  of  business  trends  in  terms  of  turnover  and 
profitability 
•  Assess grant related participation activity and the relative value attached to 
such programmes 
•  Relate this to the introduction of the New Deal initiative 
•  Determine the nature of the New Deal, its client group, the main social and 
economic factors and the needs of the business community. 
•  Assess the perceived value of New Deal as a tool for recruitment and growth 
•  Identify the key operational issues when small businesses chose to work with 
New Deal 
 
The  survey  was  conducted  in  three  stages  between  December  1998  and  October 
2000. 
 
 
 
 Method 
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The three stages of the survey were: 
 
•  Stage 1 Benchmarking Questionnaire              Dec 1998 – June 1999 
•  Stage 2. Mid Point Questionnaire                    August 1999 – February 2000 
•  Stage 3. Final Evaluative questionnaire.          March 2000 – October 2000 
 
The survey was phased in such a way that each respondent would experience the 
same frequency of contact ensuring a consistency of approach i.e. each respondent 
would  be  contacted  at  approximately  6  monthly  intervals.  The  phasing  of  this 
approach  determined  that  the  survey  was  conducted  over  22-month  period.  The 
questionnaires  were  structured  consisting  mainly  of  closed  response  formatted 
questions but did include some open questions.   The questionnaires are summarised 
as follows 
 
Questionnaire 1 
Baseline data 
Nature of business. Size and scope of business 
Use of employment and training grants 
Anticipated issues in New Deal 
Intention as regard New Deal 
 
Questionnaire 2 
Developing issues in New Deal involvement 
Developing trends in company performance 
Practical considerations in working with New Deal  
Issues to be considered 
 
Questionnaire 3 
Overall assessment of New Deal against company interests 
Practical issues in use of New Deal 
Use of New Deal to assist recruitment 
Trends in company performance during use of New Deal Method 
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All businesses in the survey were sent a letter of introduction around a week before 
being contacted by telephone. At each interview point, three calls per business were 
made to establish contact. Where the businesses was unable unwilling or unavailable 
to participate in the survey no further attempts at contact were made after the final 
third call. 
 
Survey Selection 
The six areas in which the survey businesses were located were selected from the 
144 Employment Service Districts across the UK. The areas were chosen with the 
aim of securing a reasonable balance of economic, social and geographical factors.  
Each of the 144 area units of delivery in the UK was contacted to assess the nature of 
New  Deal  partnership  development  in  their  area,  the  specific  economic  factors 
supporting small business involvement in New Deal and their willingness to become 
part of the survey. 78 replies to this were received of which approximately 20 were 
willing to become involved.  
 
Six of these 20 were chosen for their common characteristics of high unemployment 
and long-term unemployment and the economic and social factors most commonly 
associated with this. These areas exemplify local communities experiencing major 
economic transitions, represent high concentrations of the New Deal target group and 
raises the issue that if New Deal cannot be made to operate effectively in these areas, 
where  might  it  operate  well  and  what  implications  for  its  structure,  delivery  and 
effectiveness arise. 
 
The areas selected were: 
￿  East Ayrshire. A declining rural-industrial-mining community. This area had 
a  New  Deal  approach  of  a  unique  partnership  attempted  through  the 
establishment  of  an  independent  limited  company  to  run  New  Deal 
operations. 
￿  East  Sussex.  A  declining  economy  on  the  edge  of  London  comprising  a 
mixture of urban and rural. 
￿  North West Wales. An area of rural decline  
￿  London. Greenwich/Thameside/ Dartford. An area of inner city decline Method 
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￿  Portsmouth.  A  declining  area  suffering  the  withdrawal  of  a  major  public 
sector investor (Royal Navy) 
￿  Glasgow. A major city facing the issues of declining industry and structural 
unemployment. 
 
All of these areas were experiencing rates of unemployment greater than the national, 
an in many cases regional, average and all had economies where the small business 
sector was the dominant employer.  
 
Table 2.1  Unemployment and Long Term Unemployment by Area (%) 
 
%  Unemployment Rates  Long Term Unemployment Rates 
  1998  1999  2000  1998  1999  2000 
Area Mean  5.9  5.7  4.9  29.2  29.2  26.9 
Area St. Dev  0.99  1.0  1.0  4.  3.2  2.9 
UK Mean  4.3  4.1  3.46  26.4  24.8  21.7 
Source ONS 
 
The  variance  of  unemployment  rates  across  the  six  areas  is  very  low,  a  typical 
standard  deviation  of  just  1  per  cent.  Moreover  the  correlation  between  the 
unemployment levels across the six chosen areas is high both between 1998 & 1999 
(r= 0.955) and between 1999 and 2000 (r= 0.963,) indicating that unemployment 
levels were consistently high over time.  
 
At  the  commencement  of  New  Deal  in  1998,  the  main  social  and  economic 
characteristics of the survey areas selected were as outlined below. 
 
East Ayrshire 
Traditionally this area was dependent on deep mining and manufacturing as the two 
most significant aspects of local economic activity. By the introduction of the New 
Deal  the  East  Ayrshire  labour  market  now  had  its  main  employment  base  in 
distribution, hotels, catering, public services, manufacturing and textiles. The latter 
accounting  for  a  significant  aspect  of  the  local  economy  and  as  a  sector  being 
particularly vulnerable to market fluctuation. Reliance on the public sector as a key 
provider  of  employment  is  pronounced  in  this  area  where  few  large  employers 
remain. 75 per cent of all private employees are within small businesses with less Method 
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than 10 employees. Long-term unemployment is a significant and stubborn trend in 
the area.  
 
East Sussex/Eastbourne (Hastings) 
The Eastbourne district comprises the towns of Eastbourne, Bexhill and Hastings as 
well as their associated outlying rural areas. The broad travel to work pattern covers 
a much wider locality incorporating Tunbridge Wells, Lewes and Brighton. 
 
While  the  population  as  a  whole  is  fairly  evenly  distributed  with  approximately 
80000 people living in each area (total pop. 250000) the spread of New Deal eligible 
clients is concentrated mostly in the Hastings area which has about half of those 
eligible. 
 
The local labour market consists of a high proportion of service industries, mainly 
retail  and  tourism  related  with  most  employment  in  these  concentrated  in  small 
business. Tourism still holds as a major employer in the area. Most local businesses 
are not owned locally; a destabilising factor as relocation is always a possibility.  
 
Regular employer surveys indicate the significant issue of basic employability skills 
in the recruitment process with literacy, numeracy and reliability featuring strongly 
in  these.  Deprivation  levels  suggest  the  area  has  significant  experience  of  social 
disadvantage  and  physical  decay.  A  stock  of  cheap,  poor  quality  private  rented 
housing attracts young unemployed people to the area. The area has a poor transport 
infrastructure, which is especially limited in its outlying areas. 
 
 
North West Wales 
There is considerable variation in the economic characteristics of different locales 
within  the  Northwest  area.  The  rural-remote  districts  differ  greatly  in  economic 
structure from the more readily accessible districts of the northern coast. Seasonality 
is a more serious problem in the coastal areas where seasonal unemployment can 
reach up to seven times the national unemployment rate. 
 Method 
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Overall the employed labour force of NorthWest Wales has a relatively broad base of 
expertise in different occupational areas.  An area wide decrease in full time work 
has  followed  the  national  pattern.  This  has  been  accompanied  by  an  associated 
increase in part time work and self-employment. 
 
Average  household  income  for  the  area  is  low  by  national  standards.  Male 
unemployment  and  long-term  unemployment  continue  to  be  another  source  of 
concern, as does a declining rate of male economic activity. Another major concern 
is the high number of unqualified people in the local economy, especially  young 
people. In this, there are implications for the development of a skilled workforce.  
 
 
London – Thameside and Dartford (Greenwich) 
The  delivery  unit  area  covers  18.4  square  miles  stretching  from  Deptford  to 
Thamesmead, along the south bank of the Thames covering an area from Woolwich 
in the North to New Eltham in the South. In 1996 the area had a population of just 
over 200,000, and composes a similar demographic profile as for the City of London 
as a whole.  
 
There are approximately 3200 business units within the area, the vast majority of 
these small businesses. The breakdown of firms by size in Greenwich is typical of 
many areas in the sense most employ less than 25 people. At the commencement of 
the New Deal initiative it was estimated that there were about 50,000 jobs in the area 
across  approximately  3,300  employers.  The  area  ranks  as  the  14
th  most 
disadvantaged  local  authority  district  in  England  area  out  of  the  366  such  areas 
(1998).  
 
Portsmouth 
Portsmouth is the major centre of employment in the south east of Hampshire and 
possesses a thriving ferry port and several companies HQs. ICT; financial services 
and education form the major part of the city’s economy. Portsmouth University is 
the largest employer in the City. Portsmouth is also a busy tourist centre attracting 
over 4 million people a year.  Method 
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Within the city there are areas of severe and deep-rooted deprivation. These areas 
suffer  from  unemployment,  poor  housing,  and  an  associated  range  of  social 
problems. In 1997/98, at the beginning of the New Deal initiative, Portsmouth was 
ranked as the 44
th most disadvantaged local authority in England. Some wards within 
these  areas  fall  within  the  bottom  worst  1  per  cent  of  national  Department  of 
Environment deprivation indices. 
 
At the beginning of New Deal the local Employment Service reported that difficult to 
fill occupations were identified as skilled trades, vehicle mechanics, metalworkers, 
skilled  construction  and  assembly  workers.  This  deficit  of  basic  ‘employability’ 
skills  is  the  single  greatest  area  of  concern  from  local  employers.  Employers 
repeatedly ask that this be addressed within training programmes undertaken. Growth 
areas within the local economy are identified as in leisure/culture/tourism, business 
services, ICT and light engineering. It is also recognised that current issues in skills 
shortage  within  the  local  labour  market  may  hinder  the  development  of  these 
opportunity sectors as well as jeopardising their future long term viability. 
 
Glasgow 
Glasgow remains, as it has long been, the most important centre of economic activity 
in Scotland representing more than 16 per cent of the country’s employment. The 
city’s  role  as  an  employment  centre  is  emphasised  by  the  fact  that  it provides  a 
greater proportion of Scotland’s jobs than it does of its population (13 per cent). Over 
the  last  75  years  the  city  has  undergone  a  massive  process  of  decline,  structural 
change and regeneration. All of these forces continue to be at work in the city’s 
economy and all are reflected in its labour market activity. 
 
The most disadvantaged areas of the city represent around 44 per cent of the overall 
city  population.  Within  these  areas,  the  issues  generated  by  unemployment  and 
poverty are especially severe. Given the fact that these areas represent just under half 
of the population gives some indication as to the structural issues experienced by the 
city’s labour market.  
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Response Rates 
Of the 360 SMEs identified at the outset, 199 made themselves available for the 
telephone interviews, which formed the basis of this approach. This reduced to 152 
for  the  second  interviews  and  94  for  the  final  interview.  The  response  rates  are 
shown in table 2.2 
 
Table 2.2 Survey Response Rates 
 
Original Sample  Interview 1  Interview 2  Interview 3 
360  199 Interviewed 
161 Unavailable 
152 Interviewed 
45 Unavailable 
2 closures 
94 Interviewed 
47 Unavailable 
9 closures 
Response rate  199/360 = 55%  152/197 = 77%  94/141 = 66% 
Business Survey: Response rates calculated excluding business closures 
 
Response  rates  were  fairly  consistent  across  all  six  areas  surveyed.  The  per  cent 
figure is the response rate at the Interview 1 stage. The somewhat higher rates for the 
two Scottish areas may be due to the geographical base of the research. However a 
chi-square goodness-of-fit test to test that all categories contain the same proportion 
of values shows that the differences are not significant (chi-square = 3.462, df = 5 p  
= 0.629. 
 
Table 2.3 Survey Response Rates by Area 
Business Survey  
 
Business Type Distribution 
360 businesses were identified and selected as representative of the SIC profile of the 
UK (Figure 2.4). The primary focus of the project survey was to identify private 
sector small businesses which will naturally exclude certain organisational types as 
either being large utilities based operations or public sector agencies. There are no 
firms  in  mining  and  Quarrying  (SIC  C),  Electricity/Gas/Water  Supply  (SIC  E), 
Area  Response Rate (%) 
East Ayrshire  62 
East Sussex  45 
Thameside and Dartford  50 
Portsmouth  51 
North West Wales  57 
Glasgow  67 
Overall  55.3 Method 
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Public Administration (SIC L), Health and Social Work (SIC N), Private Households 
(SIC P) or Extra Territorial (SIC Q) in this survey.  
 
It is clear that the SIC profile of the selected areas is very close to the UK profile 
with the exception of an over-representation in the Distribution and Retail Trade; 
Repair Vehicles, & Household Items category. The last column gives the probability 
that the sample proportion is the same as the UK proportion (hypothesis test on a 
single proportion) 
 
The  main  areas  of  activity  are  to  be  found  in  three  key  sectors;  manufacturing, 
distribution/retail  and  community/social/personal.  Collectively  these  account  for 
approximately 80per cent of the sample. 
 
Table 2.4 Business Type Distribution 
 
SIC Classification   Frequency  %  UK%  Significance(p) 
Manufacturing & construction  60  30.2  30.3  0.93 
Distribution and Retail Trade; 
Repair Vehicles, Household Items 
62  31.2  23.4  0.01 
Hotels and Restaurants  15  7.5  6.4  0.53 
Transport, Storage and 
Communication 
10  5.0  6.8  0.31 
Other   11  5.5  12.8  0.002 
Other Community, Social and 
Personal Service Activities 
41  20.6  20.3  0.94 
Total  199       
Business survey 
 
All of the areas had a high percentage of their private workforce employed by small 
businesses,  suggesting  very  few  large  private  employers  for  these  areas  and  a 
dependence on the SME as a critical component of the local economy.  
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Table 2.5   Private Workforce Employed by SMEs  <50FTE  (%) 
 
Area  % 
East Ayrshire  90 
East Sussex  88 
North West Wales  92 
London – Thameside and Dartford  87 
Portsmouth  88 
Glasgow  90 
UK  68 
Source: New Deal delivery plans for each area. Employment Service 1997 
 
The firms encountered at this benchmarking phase represented a total employment 
base of approximately 2500 individuals (estimated over the three years prior to the 
survey and prior to the introduction of New Deal). These figures will be used to 
inform  the  interpretation  of  small  firm  employment  growth  alongside  the 
introduction of New Deal 
 
Given the definition of small business adopted for this survey (<50 employees) it 
produced a range of companies fairly evenly spread across this. The following table 
outlines that roughly half of these had less than 10 employees, with 42 per cent 
having between 10 and 49 employees. This is not representative of the UK spread in 
term of SMEs and employee numbers in that in a normal spread most SMEs would 
be concentrated in the 1-5 category. 
 
Table 2.6 Comparison of Size of Firm between Survey Sample and UK  (%) 
 
Firm Size (employees)  Sample %  UK % 
0  0.5  1.3 
1-4  27.0  62.9 
5-9  26.5  19.2 
10-49  42.0  15.3 
50-99  4.0  1.0 
100+  0.0  0.3 
Source: FSB 2000 N=22000 
 
From this it is apparent that the size of company spread in the business survey may 
be  distorted  towards  the  larger  end  of  the  small  business  range.  In  the  FSB  UK 
survey (table 2.6), 84 per cent of all businesses were in the <10 employees range, in 
the business survey this figure is 54 per cent. This may be due to a ‘preselection bias’ Method 
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effect  because  of  the  nature  of  company  selection  for  the  survey,  central  to  this 
report, where only those companies intent on working with New Deal at the earliest 
stage were selected.  
 
These organisations may have been able to grasp the issues involved in New Deal 
participation  more  readily,  feeling  confident  that  they  had  the  personnel  systems 
required to work with it. It may be the case that this approach left out many smaller 
businesses as they had no intention of working with New Deal or were undecided, 
hence favouring the larger type of firm in the selection of the survey cohort. 
 
However for the purposes of this study it offers an opportunity to assess how the 
behaviour of a more even spread of business size behaves against the introduction of 
the New Deal initiative within the terms of the research approach outlined. 
 
The business surveyed tended towards the older end in terms of years established 
with over 50 per cent operational for 10 years or more. This should help to account 
for  some  of  the  more  unpredictable  business  factors,  which  might  influence 
behaviour in younger rather than more mature firms. This should assist in gaining an 
insight into the New Deal affect across a stable study cohort.  
 
Table 2.7 Company Age 
 
Trading Years  No.  % 
Less than 1 Year  2  1 
2 Years  7  4 
3-5 Years  44  22 
6-10 Years  39  20 
10 Years +  107  53 
Business Survey N=199 
 
From  this,  we  determine  that  the  study  cohort  is  a  relatively  mature  set  of 
organisations. 
 
The Case Studies 
Given the limitations of a survey-based approach working within the structure of a 
questionnaire, it was felt necessary to complement this work with further qualitative Method 
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investigation. Following from the original cohort of businesses interviewed, and the 
information that a three-stage survey was able to provide, the issues raised by this 
were  developed  in  further  detail.  This  undertaken  by  way  of  in  depth  follow  up 
interview  based  on  a  case  study  format  for  27  of  these  businesses.  These  are  
summarised as follows, in terms of their SIC classification and the total number of 
staff currently employed. 
 
Table 2.8 The Case Study Businesses 
 
SIC Classification  Frequency  Case studies  
% 
Survey 
% 
Case studies Aggregate 
employees 
Manufacturing & construction  9  33.3  30.2  125 
Distribution and Retail Trade; Repair 
Vehicles, Household Items 
12  44.4  31.2  59 
Hotels and Restaurants  2  7.4  7.5  38 
Transport, Storage and Communication  0  0  5.0  0 
Other   1  3.7  5.5  4 
Other Community, Social and Personal 
Service Activities 
3  11.1  20.6  35 
Total  27    199  261 
Business Survey 
 
The table shows that the case studies were broadly representative of the main sectors 
which  feature  as  part  of  this  research  approach.  Further,  they  were  selected  to 
provide a representative coverage of the six locations used. The experiences of these 
businesses are used to support the interpretation of the survey undertaken.  
 
Case Study Questionnaire 
The questionnaire which was used as part of this follow up process was designed to 
expand and illustrate on the responses elicited by the main earlier three stage survey. 
In  the  main  this  was  to  be  concerned  with  establishing  the  specific  difficulties 
experienced in workings with the New Deal and the issues small businesses must 
consider when recruiting from the long-term   unemployed 
 
Limitations 
Several  methodological  issues  in  the  development  of  the  business  survey  have 
limited the interpretation of the data presented.  
 Method 
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The requirement to initiate an early start to the business survey, to coincide with the 
commencement of the New Deal  led to  the omission of several key reporting fields 
which, in retrospect,  would have improved the quality of the survey data. These 
relate mainly the age and background of the New Deal candidate which would have 
allowed for greater differential analysis of the various New Deal programmes, and 
the selection of similar areas for the focus of the business survey.  
 
The areas identified for this survey comprise a representative sample of the areas in 
which  New  Deal  was  likely  to  have  its  most  significant  impact  i.e.  areas  with 
vulnerable  local  economies  and  above  average  unemployment.  All  of  the  areas 
chosen  were  categorised  as  high  unemployment.  Given  this,  a  comparative  inter 
regional assessment of high and low unemployment areas within the survey could 
not be assessed. In this regard, this has limited the scope of statistical interpretation. 
Finally, the data collated relates only to the timeframe of the survey 1998-2000. 
 
The identification of the survey businesses was assisted by the local Employment 
Service.  All participants on this had indicated their willingness to work with the 
New  Deal  initiative.  This  helps  to  explain  the  very  high  rates  of  enthusiasm 
encountered for the New Deal at the initial contact stage. 
 
If New Deal were to encounter difficulties in establishing itself within groups of 
employers who were already attracted to it, it would be reasonable to assume that any 
issues arising would apply more generally across small businesses of similar size, 
sector and social/economic context. If it could not work with those who wanted to 
work with it, where could it work? Employment Outcomes and Business Benefits 
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Introduction 
The following chapter examines the nature of the relationship between the general 
expectation of the wage subsidy intervention and the observed effect in the case of 
the  New  Deal.  It  reviews  how  such  small  businesses  recruit  new  staff,  and  the 
processes through which they work towards this. It then examines patterns in small 
business  recruitment  against  the  introduction  of  the  New  Deal  and  assesses  how 
small businesses have adjusted to this new form of recruitment assistance. It will 
look at the quality and quantity of the employment stimulated and, finally, will seek 
to demonstrate what benefit the New Deal has been able to offer to small business. 
 
 
Wage Subsidy Recruitment 
At the centre of the employment option of the New Deal model is a wage subsidy 
approach, premised on the assumption that the availability of grant support to recruit 
the  long-term  unemployed  may  induce  a  positive  recruitment  effect  for  the 
participating businesses.  
 
This wage subsidy feature of the New Deal might have been observed to produce 
1.  Businesses recruiting more people than they might normally have done as a 
direct result of participation  - an additional employment effect 
2.  Businesses recruiting the same number of people but employing  a larger 
proportion of the long term unemployed than might normally have been the 
case – a substitution effect 
3.  A combination of 1 and 2 above 
4.  No  extra  recruitment  occurs,  the  ratio  of  long  term  unemployed  recruits 
remains unaltered but the business is now able to claim a grant for this. A 100 
per cent deadweight scenario 
 
Employers have a variety of reasons for participating in the New Deal (Elam and 
Snape 2000). As illustrated in Table 3.1 these would appear not to be entirely related 
to  the  welfare  of  the  long-term  unemployed  seeking  to  reintegrate  in  the  labour 
market.  
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Table 3.1 Motivation to Participate in New Deal (%) - Typology of Employers  
 
Business Motivation  % 
Opportunistic – Business expanding anyway, might as well use New Deal   37 
Altruistic – Genuine desire to help the unemployed   12 
Strategic – New Deal as used to change the profile of the workplace or to 
take advantage of training opportunity  
14 
Responsive – convinced by and responsive to Employment Service approach 
overtures  
6 
Mixed  28 
(Elam and Snape 2000) 
 
Businesses, by and large, intend that any involvement they have with the New Deal 
would  be  of  direct  operational  and  commercial  benefit.  A  small  minority  of 
businesses indicate altruistic purposes in engaging with the New Deal, however by 
far the greatest interest in working with the New Deal relates to the benefit that it can 
bring to the business. 
 
The decision to employ in this way is not a simple function of grant availability. The 
attractiveness  of  employment  grants  to  employers  is  bound  in  with  many  other 
factors critical to effective business functioning. This issue is explored through the 
empirical evidence base for this dissertation. 
 
 
The Survey Businesses 
Up until the introduction of the New Deal very few businesses in the survey had 
experience of employment grant assistance. However, at the introduction of the New 
Deal  around  three-quarters  of  employers  said  they  were  willing  to  consider  such 
methods. This marks a clear difference in how the New Deal has been promoted and 
received in comparison to previous approaches (King and Wickham Jones 1997) and 
suggests a willingness to adapt recruitment practices to account for this. 
 
In  terms  of  a  baseline  for  the  survey,  only  16  per  cent  of  the  199  employers 
participating  in  the  first  business  survey  had  ever  attempted  to  use  any  type  of 
Government related employment grants. Where these grants had been used, around 
half of the activity was related to meeting increased training costs with the remainder 
used to subsidise wages and to assist in recruitment.  Employment Outcomes and Business Benefits 
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There were no significant differences in the limited use of these grants by age of 
company (chi-square = 4.95, df = 3, p = 0.176) or by sector (chi-square = 1.60, df = 
3, p = 0.659). There was a significant difference by size of company with larger 
companies tending to use grants more often (chi-square = 10.83, df = 3, p = 0.004).  
 
Around  one  in  four  of  companies  with  over  15  employees  had  used  recruitment 
grants in the previous five years compared with only 9 per cent of companies with 
fewer  employees.  This  supports  the  suggestion  that  larger,  more  established 
companies have a developed human resource function which made the use of these 
grants  less  of  an  overall  burden  on  company  activity  (Fraser  and  Storey  2002; 
Hasluck 1999; Storey 1998)    
 
A similarly limited effect was evident in the case of grant based recruitment for these 
businesses.  In  the  three  years  in  the  run  up  to  the  introduction  of  New  Deal 
(1996/97/98) company recruitment across the survey base averaged at around 5 per 
cent of total employee numbers. 393 individuals were recruited by these businesses 
in the years 1996-98. Of this 5 staff (1.3 per cent) were recruited through the use of 
employment grants similar in intent to the New Deal.  
 
Table 3.2 Recruitment in Survey Businesses. Year Average 1996-1998. Baseline 
Summary 
 
Size of 
company 
by 
employees 
Average  
number of 
employees 
per 
business  
Average number 
of recruits per 
year per business 
per year 
Total 
average 
FTE (all 
businesses) 
Total recruits 
per year (all 
businesses) 
% recruitment 
achieved 
through grants 
- past 3 years  
1-15  
(n = 139) 
6.2  0.4  868  62  0.9 
16+ 
(n = 60) 
31.5  1.2  1888  69  2.3 
All 
(n= 199) 
13.8  0.7  2756  131  1.3 
Business survey 
 
 
From this it is evident that, in this context, employer use of recruitment related grants 
presents a very low activity baseline at the introduction of the New Deal. 
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Anticipated Issues in New Deal 
Against this very low baseline, the business survey suggests that initial employer 
impressions of the New Deal were generally positive. Table 3.3 shows that only 15 
per cent of employers said they would not participate in the New Deal programme 
and almost 3 out of 4 employers were favourable towards employing through this 
mechanism.  
 
Table 3.3 Anticipated New Deal Participation 
 
Participation Method  Total  % 
Employer  147    74 
Placement Provider/Employer  2    1.0 
Will Not Participate  30   15 
Undecided  20    10.1 
Total  199  100 
Business survey 
 
There  was  no  significant  difference  by  the  main  sectors  of  manufacturing, 
distribution/retail and community/social; (chi-square test, chi-square= 4.53, df = 9, p 
= 0.874). There was a slight, but not significant, difference by size of employer with 
larger employers showing somewhat less interest than smaller employers (chi-square 
test, chi-square= 7.73, df = 6, p = 0.258) 
 
In table 3.4, using a category scoring of 0=will not participate, 1=undecided and 2= 
participate as employer; there was no difference, by mean score, in intended use 
across the main three sectors (Anova, f= 0.286, df = 3, p = 0.835). However there 
was a significant difference by size of employer (Anova, f= 0.3.157, df = 2, p = 
0.045)  with  the  larger  employers  showing  significantly  less  enthusiasm  for  the 
subsidy than smaller companies. 
 
Table 3.4 Anticipated Participation by Size of Employer (%) 
 
 Participation Method  Category Score by Number of Employees  Total 
Number of employees  1-5  6-15  16+  N  % 
Participate as Employer  80.3  77.8  61.7  147    74 
Will Not Participate  10.5  12.7  23.3  30  15 
Undecided  9.2  9.5  15.0  22    11 
N  76  63  60  199  100 
Business survey Employment Outcomes and Business Benefits 
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This appears to contradict the previous general experiences of such subsidies where 
larger  companies  tend  to  take  a  greater  interest  (Hasluck  1999;  Storey  1998).  A 
possible explanation for this may be that larger businesses are more likely to have 
experience of using similar grants and, therefore, experience of the operational issues 
they present (Fraser and Storey 2002 and Hasluck 1999). This may lead to them 
being more cautious in their approach to New Deal than smaller businesses entirely 
new to this. 
 
Difficulties 
In  the  initial  contact  stage  of  the  business  survey  questionnaire,  businesses  were 
asked to anticipate the difficulties that could arise as part of their prospective New 
Deal activity and which might jeopardise their involvement. Almost half could not 
foresee any difficulties at all whilst the most cited problem, (quality of recruit), was 
only seen as a potential problem by around 1 in 5 (table 3.5) 
 
Table 3.5   Anticipated Difficulties in involvement with New Deal (%) 
 
Anticipated Difficulty  % 
None  44.7 
Quality of recruit  21.1 
Poor support/bureaucracy  15.6 
Training commitment  9.5 
Financial commitment  2.5 
Will not participate  6.5 
Total  199 
Business survey 
 
Across the four main anticipated difficulties (None, Quality of recruit, Poor support/ 
bureaucracy  and  Training/  Financial  commitment)  there  were  no  significant 
differences either by sector (chi-square test, chi-square= 8.47, df = 15, p = 0.904) or 
by size of company (chi-square test, chi-square= 15.64, df = 10, p = 0.110). This 
would suggest a general optimism towards working with the New Deal. 
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Table 3.6 Anticipated Difficulties in Working with the New Deal (%) – size of   
business 
 
Size of company by employees  1-15  16+  all 
None  45  43  45 
Quality of recruit  22  18  21 
Poor support/bureaucracy  13  22  16 
Training/ Financial commitment  14  7  12 
Will not participate  5  10  7 
Total  139  60  199  
Business survey 
 
It is clear from these findings that businesses felt confident in being able to work 
with New Deal. Three out of four expected to use the subsidy for a range of purposes 
suited to their business needs. There were no differences across sectors but there was 
evidence that smaller companies were keener  on the New Deal than larger ones, 
possibly attracted by the benefit of wage subsidy (Fraser and Storey 2002). 
 
 Benefits 
The most common business benefits that employers felt would be realised through 
New  Deal  activity  was  in  training  support  and  wage  subsidy,  which  together 
accounted for 57 per cent of the responses to the business survey. 
 
Table 3.7 Benefits that the New Deal Employment Subsidy (%) 
 
Potential Business Benefit  % 
Training support  35 
Wage subsidy  22 
Recruitment solution  12 
Working capital  10 
Other  6 
Will not use  15 
Total  199 
Business survey   
 
Once again there was no significant difference between sectors (chi-square test, chi-
square= 13.60, df = 15, p = 0.556) but there was between companies of differing 
sizes (chi-square test, chi-square= 18.54, df = 10, p = 0.047). In particular, larger 
companies were less likely to use the New Deal as a simple wage subsidy but were 
more likely to use it as a recruitment solution for difficult to fill posts.  This supports Employment Outcomes and Business Benefits 
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the observation that large businesses appear interested in wage subsidies as a solution 
to recruitment issues whilst small business employers are more likely to be attracted 
to a wage subsidy because of its capacity to directly offset the cost of employment 
(Fraser and Storey 2002; Hasluck 1999; Storey 1998).  
 
Finally, the New Deal was very much seen as a new resource with only one of the 
199 respondents saying that it would replace existing grants. There was therefore no 
significant  evidence  from  this  group  that  New  Deal  would  replace  any  existing 
employment grant activity. 
 
 
Small Business Recruitment  
Fielder (1992) observes that small businesses tend to rely on word of mouth referrals 
as the most important part of the recruitment process. In this scenario, high levels of 
human  capital  are  instrumental  in  determining  successful  labour  market  access 
(McQuaid, Greig and Adams 2004). This offers greater control over the recruitment 
process through the use of personal networks based on family, friends and business 
associates – often better placed to offer some guarantee of applicant suitability than a 
recruitment  agency  or  open  recruitment  process.  It  is  less  expensive  than  formal 
advertising and helps minimise the risk of making an unsuccessful appointment. It 
helps  introduce  new  employees  of  similar  characteristics  to  existing  employees 
making successful reintegration to the workplace more likely.   
 
In overall terms, small businesses refer a minority of their employment vacancies 
through  the  Employment  Service  or  similar  recruitment  intermediaries  (Bunt, 
McAndrew  and  Keuchal  2007).  This  general  experience  is  reflected  in  the 
recruitment activities of the survey businesses. 
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Table 3.8 Recruitment Practices of Survey Businesses (%) 
 
Size of company by employees  Principal Recruitment method 
1-15  16+ 
         (%) 
Word of Mouth  43  27  38 
Newspaper Adverts  21  47  29 
Employment Service  30  25  29 
Other   6  2  5 
Total (N)  139  60  199 
Business survey 
By occupational sector, there were no significant differences across the three main 
recruitment methods - word of mouth, newspaper adverts and Employment Service 
(chi-square = 4.98 df = 4 p = 0.289).  
 
There were clear differences by size of company (chi-square = 12.84 df = 2 p = 
0.02).  43 per cent of the smallest companies use word of mouth compared to 27 per 
cent of the larger companies. 47 per cent of the larger businesses use newspaper 
adverts compared to 21 per cent of smaller businesses. There was  also a similar 
pattern by age of company with youngest enterprises likely to use word of mouth and 
the oldest more likely to use newspaper adverts. In this case, the differences were not 
quite significant (chi-square = 11.23 df = 6 p = 0.082) and may, in any case, be 
related  more  to  the  fact  that  younger  companies  tend  towards  a  more  informal 
structure.  The  use  of  Employment  Service  was  relatively  stable  across  size  of 
company.  
 
This would suggest some trepidation for many small businesses in entering into parts 
of  the  labour  market  that  they  do  not  know  or  understand,  instead  relying  on 
relatively low risk but necessarily limited small personal network based recruitment. 
It also appears that the smaller and younger the business, the more likely it is to use 
word of mouth recruitment. 
 
Fielder  (1992)  notes  this  reliance  on  a  ‘word  of  mouth’  approach  as  especially 
significant given the characteristics of many of the high unemployment communities 
New Deal would typically focus on – where weak social structures do not support Employment Outcomes and Business Benefits 
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effective word of mouth networks (Campbell 2000; Lee 1999; Meager and Metcalf 
1998).  
 
New Deal Recruitment  
Against a historical lack of interest and very low take-up of employment grants, 
almost all of the respondents indicated their willingness to work with the New Deal 
initiative – 75 per cent definitely committed with 10 per cent undecided. For just 
about  all  businesses  in  the  survey,  New  Deal  would  be  their  first  experience  of 
employment subsidy.  
 
This can be interpreted as a strong indicator of interest to participate as employers. 
Considering  the  traditional  reliance  of  such  small  business  on  word  of  mouth 
recruitment, this enthusiasm to develop alternative recruitment methods through the 
New Deal can also be viewed as a positive statement of intent. Given the difficulties 
experienced  in  recruiting  through  such  a  model  –  both  because  of  its  use  of 
employment  subsidies  and  the  recruitment  focus  as  being  quite  separate  from  a 
traditional word of mouth approach, this appears as an interesting development for 
the businesses surveyed and indicates a desire to change the manner in which they 
recruit and operate.  
 
Converting Good Intention 
At  the  introductory  stage  of  the  New  Deal,  most  survey  businesses  appeared 
optimistic. About half of the respondents anticipated no real difficulties in working 
with  the  New  Deal.  It  would  appear  to  suggest  an  encouraging  platform  for  the 
development of a new labour supply.  
 
Where difficulties were anticipated, they related to misgivings about the quality of 
recruit, bureaucratic issues and the obligation that New Deal placed on businesses to 
introduce recruits to VQ level 2 (or on course to level 2) accredited training. 
 
If recruitment trends were to be maintained from their 1996-98 levels (at around 5per 
cent per annum) from a total business employment base of around 2500, we might 
anticipate somewhere in the region of 120 new recruits employed (for n =199). From Employment Outcomes and Business Benefits 
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this baseline we might expect to see a significant increase in the rate of recruitment 
assisted by New Deal grant intervention. This relationship between the anticipated 
and actual recruitment behaviour of small businesses when working with New Deal 
is of central interest. 
 
A wage subsidy payment should reduce the wage labour costs faced by an employer 
and increase rates of employment as labour costs decrease. This reduction in labour 
costs should encourage firms to expand employment. As real wage levels fall, rates 
of  employment  rise.  However,  this  simplicity  of  this  relationship  is  tested  when 
business  productivity  is  reduced  and  working  practices  disrupted  through  the 
introduction of new employees.  
 
The introduction of the New Deal occurred as only one of the many  operational 
influences impacting on the shape and behaviour of the survey business at that time. 
As  such,  this  early  enthusiasm  to  work  with  New  Deal  and  the  simple  positive 
employment effect anticipated became more difficult to realise in a complex and 
volatile business environment.  
 
The  survey  reports  a  positive  outlook  for  employment,  turnover  and  profitability 
across  the  main  respondent  group.  This  optimism  is  supported  by  the  external 
environment  where  the  unemployment  rate  was  falling.  Between  1998  and  2000 
across the survey areas the unemployment rate fell at both the local and national 
level. There was an 18 per cent decrease in the area mean for general unemployment, 
and 8 per cent reduction in long-term unemployment. There was also a 19 per cent 
reduction in general, and 18 per cent reduction in long-term, unemployment for this 
period at the UK national level. This general business stability, promising business 
outlook  and  favourable  economic  climate  might  reasonably  suggested  a  positive 
environment to which the New Deal could be introduced. 
 
Anticipated and Actual Recruitment 
For the survey businesses, recruitment in the three years prior to the introduction of 
New Deal was concentrated in three main sectors of  Distribution/Retail (SIC G,H), 
Manufacturing (SIC D) and Community, Social, Personal (SIC O). In the three years Employment Outcomes and Business Benefits 
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leading to the introduction of the New Deal (1996-98), the total average aggregate 
number of employees in these sectors, as established from the initial questionnaire, 
was 2556. Staff recruitment for the average year was 124  - around 5 per cent. 
 
Table 3.9 Recruitment Patterns 1996-1998 
 
Sector  Average recruitment 
pa 
Average Full Time Employees pa 
1996-1998 
Distribution and Retail  44  777 
Manufacturing  25  547 
Community, Social and Personal  36  543 
Other  19  689 
  124  2556 
Business survey 
When questioned on their plans for future recruitment, the number of jobs estimated 
for these businesses over the first year of New Deal (1998-99) was 366 or 14 per cent 
of the total workforce.  Of this, 157 (43 per cent) were anticipated as New Deal.  
 
This  presented  an  anticipated  increase  in  general  recruitment  activity  when 
considering the modest increases from 1996/98, set out above.  Forecast recruitment 
was around three times the rate (14 per cent) of the previous three years (5 per cent).  
 
Part of this rise may be suggested by the change in behaviour predicted by the use of 
wage subsidy and recruitment in small businesses where the introduction of a grant 
measure should induce a positive effect on recruitment behaviour.  This seems to 
reinforce the general view among the employer group that they did not anticipate any 
real impediments to their work with the New Deal. 
 
In this, table 3.10 shows there were clear differences by size of company.  New Deal 
jobs accounted for 53.7 per cent of the anticipated jobs for smaller companies but 
only  35.5  per  cent  of  those  for  larger  companies.  This  was  a  highly  significant 
difference (z = 3.46, p = 0.0005) and might be due to the manner in which larger 
businesses tend to use these subsidies as a method of filling an existing or planned 
job  vacancy.  Smaller  companies  tend  to  act  more  opportunistically  and  use  such Employment Outcomes and Business Benefits 
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subsidies  to  directly  offset  general  employment  costs  (Fraser  and  Storey  2002; 
Hasluck 1999; Storey 1998).  
 
For smaller companies about half who anticipated recruiting through New Deal, did 
so (27.9 per cent opposed to 53.7 per cent). For larger companies, only about one-
fifth of this anticipated recruitment was evidenced. This may indicate the difference 
between  a  general  policy  position  on  New  Deal  reported  by  larger  companies 
through the business survey as opposed to a direct commitment expressed by smaller 
businesses. 
 
Table 3.10 Recruitment Activity 1998-1999 
 
Size of company by employees   
1-15  (n = 139)  16+ (n = 60)  All (n= 199) 
New Deal Activity 
Total employees    Total employees    Total Employees 
Anticipated New Deal as 
percentage of anticipated 
recruitment 
53.7% 
(80/149) 
35.5% 
(77/217) 
42.9% 
(157/366) 
Actual New deal as percentage 
of actual recruitment 
27.9% 
(12/43) 
7.3% 
(4/55) 
16.3% 
(16/98) 
Business survey 
 
There  were  some  significant  ‘like  for  like’  differences  by  size  of  company  with 
respect to New Deal jobs over the timeframe. New Deal recruitment as a percentage 
of total recruitment was 27.9 per cent for smaller companies but only 7.3 per cent for 
larger companies (z = 2.74, p = 0.006). There were no significant differences by 
sector in terms of the actual New Deal recruitment (chi-square = 1.19, df = 2 p > 
.05).  
 
When the companies were revisited the following year (n = 152) 70 new jobs were 
anticipated over the coming year or just 3 per cent of the total workforce. This was 
lower than in the previous year. However a higher percentage were anticipated to be 
through New Deal (71.4 per cent).   
 
The overall percentage of actual recruitment to New Deal jobs was 50.1 per cent 
(Table 3.11).  This closer match between anticipated and actual recruitment may be 
influenced by the realities of working with the New Deal initiative where operational Employment Outcomes and Business Benefits 
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issues  began  to  impact  on  early  enthusiasm.  Interestingly  there  were  now  no 
significant  differences  by  size  of  company,  both  smaller  and  larger  companies 
recruited around 50 per cent to New Deal jobs (z = 0.38, p > .05). There was also no 
significant difference by sector (chi-square = 1.11, df = 2, p > .05). 
 
Table 3.11 Recruitment Activity 1999-2000 
 
Size of company by employees   
1-15  (n = 106)  16+ (n = 46)  All (n= 152) 
New Deal Activity 
Total employees    Total employees    Total Employees 
New Deal as percentage of 
anticipated recruitment 
75% 
(36/48) 
63.6% 
(14/22) 
71.4% 
(50/70) 
Actual New Deal as 
percentage of actual 
recruitment 
53.1% 
(17/32) 
48.1% 
(13/27) 
50.1% 
(30/59) 
Business survey 
 
Between the original consultation and the final point of the survey some 18 months 
later anticipated overall recruitment was overestimated by around 400 per cent and 
anticipated recruitment through New Deal offers an even greater overestimate. 157 
New Deal recruits were anticipated over the first year of the initiative with the actual 
figure amounting to 16 in 1998-1999 and 30 in 1999-2000. Even allowing for the 
effect  of  a  reduced  sample  size  over  the two  sample  periods  (-24  per  cent),  this 
represents a degree of employer optimism regarding anticipated New Deal benefit, 
which  does  not  fit  with  the  reality.  Little  additional  employment  effect  appears 
evident and recruitment appears as slowing despite the introduction of the New Deal 
within a generally stable business environment. 
 
Recruitment by Sector 
At the second stage interview, around the end of the first year of New Deal, out of 
152 companies surveyed, 61.4per cent (19.0+42.4) had anticipated recruiting under 
the New Deal (table 3.12).  About only a third of these had actually recruited under 
New Deal. 
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Table 3.12 Recruitment Activity 1998-2000 
 
Recruitment behaviour  % 
No recruitment anticipated  20.9 
No New Deal recruitment anticipated  17.7 
New Deal recruitment anticipated but not forthcoming  42.4 
New Deal recruitment   19.0 
Total  100 
Business Survey 
 
There  were  no  significant  differences  across  the  three  main  sectors  of  retail, 
manufacturing and community (chi-square = 11.14, df = 6, p > 0.05). There were no 
significant differences between small (15 or less employees) and larger companies 
(15+ employees) (chi-square = 1.53, df = 3, p > 0.05). 
 
Focusing now on the companies who had anticipated using New Deal, there was a 
difference between sectors where, in manufacturing, 48.4 per cent of companies who 
had anticipated using New Deal had actually recruited. Comparable figures in the 
Distribution/retail sector was 27.6 per cent. while in the community sector only 15.8 
per cent had recruited. These differences were significant (chi-square = 6.26, df = 2, 
p<0.05). 
 
Table 3.13 Recruitment Behaviour by Main Sector 1998-2000 
 
Recruitment behaviour  Distribution 
and Retail 
Manufacturing  Community, Social 
and Personal 
N 
New Deal Recruitment  8  15  3  26 
% of all recruitment  27.6%  48.4%  15.8%   
New Deal recruitment 
anticipated but not forthcoming 
21  16  16  53 
 % of all   72.4%  51.6%  84.2%   
Total Recruitment  29  31  19  79 
Business Survey 
 
Manufacturing  has  a  stronger  conversion  rate  of  New  Deal  intent  to  New  Deal 
recruitment  with  around  half  of  anticipated  recruitment  occurring  in  this  way. 
However, the numbers involved against the scale of effort and investment of New 
Deal in this case would suggest that no firm conclusions can be drawn about the 
potential of these factors as possibly informing a more focussed approach to New 
Deal effort.  
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There were no significant difference in New Deal recruitment between small (15 or 
less employees) and larger companies (more than 15 employees) (chi-square = 0.95, 
df = 1, p > 0.05). However closer examination of the smaller companies indicated 
that  New  Deal  recruitment  was  somewhat  higher  among  the  very  smallest 
companies. Recruitment rates among companies with 5 or fewer employees was 37.8 
per cent while among companies with 6-15 employees it was only 16.1per cent. This 
difference was significant (chi-square = 3.95, df = 1, p < 0.05). 
 
Table 3.14 Recruitment Behaviour by Size of Business <15 Employees 
 
Recruitment  No. of Employees 
  1-5  %  6-15  % 
New Deal Recruitment  14  37.8  5  16.1 
Anticipated but no actual New Deal Recruitment  23  62.2  26  83.9 
Total  37  100  31  100 
Business Survey 
 
   
This would appear or suggest that the smaller the business size the greater the rate of 
vacancy conversion into New Deal opportunity.  
 
In the examples, above, New Deal did not directly lead to the creation of meaningful 
levels of additional employment as might be through the use of the wage subsidies 
which underpin such interventions. Projected New Deal employment was vastly over 
optimistic and tempered by the reality of the working environment.  
 
As  introduced  earlier,  recruitment  behaviour  could  have  been  witnessed  through 
several scenarios, however from the business survey, it would appear that very little 
has been achieved in the way of additional staff recruitment through the New Deal 
and that its anticipated effect has not been realised. Even where employment has 
been created in this way, related issues of quality arise.  
 
New Deal Employment  
The New Deal approach focuses on a rapid reinsertion into employment of the long-
term unemployed. It is concentrated at the entry level, low skill, and low pay end of 
the labour market where employment turnover is highest, skills requirements lowest Employment Outcomes and Business Benefits 
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and job security weakest (Campbell 2000; Hillage and Pollard 1999; Crighton 1998). 
Of those securing employment through employment intervention programmes, at the 
time  of  the  New  Deal’s  introduction  in  1998,  over  80  per  cent  returned  to 
unemployment  within  the  first  year  Layard  (1998)  and  Taylor  (1998).  In  this, 
sustainable success is elusive.  
 
Income 
In the New Deal, it is likely that the quality of employment on offer tends towards 
lesser quality and low pay (Clarke 2002; Kitching and Blackburn 2002; Haughton 
2000; Cosh, Duncan and Hughes 1998; Strawn 1998; White and Firth 1998). The 
business survey confirms these observations, where the jobs filled by the long term 
unemployed have been low skill, low pay and with little training offered despite the 
emphasis placed on this by New Deal.   
 
In the three main sectors represented, the mean starting salary in non New Deal  jobs 
was just over £11,000 per annum but for New Deal jobs the mean was significantly 
lower, at below £9,000 pa (t –test, t = 2.96, df = 33 p = 0.007). The survey evidence 
reports that the average New Deal salary agreed (£8940 from business survey) was 
above national minimum wage at this time (£7500) but below the average entry level 
salary (£10400) reported by Brown (2001) . This confirms both the general entry-
level nature of the jobs created and re-emphasises the observation that, even within 
this context, New Deal employment tended towards the lower skill and salary level 
(Jones et al. 2004; Stewart 2002). 
 
Training 
The New Deal approach carried a heavy emphasis on the importance of training as a 
means  of  improving  workplace  competence  and  developing  a  stronger  set  of 
transferable skills which may then be used to protect the individuals place within the 
labour market; consolidating employment, making the individual more mobile and 
employable and reducing the likelihood of a return to unemployment.   
 
Referrals  through  the  New  Deal  brought  with  them  a  £750  grant  to  be  used  by 
employers  to  support  the  individual  through  VQ  accredited  training  up  to,  or  on Employment Outcomes and Business Benefits 
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course towards, the level 2 VQ. The VQ structure as understood by the New Deal 
may be viewed as an attempt to lock the individual into a long-term career track. The 
following outlines how the VQ path could be followed 
 
-  Level I - foundation or unskilled work  
-  Level II - semi-skilled / a broad range of skills and responsibilities  
-  Level III - complex / technical / skilled and / or supervisory work  
-  Level IV - managerial / specialist  
-  Level V - professional / senior managerial 
(SQA 2006) 
 
As Layard (1998) and Taylor (1998) report, previous experiences of employment 
intervention  programmes  such  as  the  New  Deal  do  not  sustain  employment 
placements for an initial year in four out of five cases. The training element within 
the New Deal presented an opportunity to help minimise such high rates of drop out. 
Training for staff helps improve employment sustainability by enhancing workplace 
qualifications and transferable skills (Katz 1998). 
 
Prior  to  the  introduction  of  the  New  Deal,  two  thirds  of  the  training  normally 
undertaken in the survey businesses was conducted informally, in-house and on the 
job. Little of this was conducted to VQ accredited standard and therefore was of 
limited  general  recognition  and  transferability  outside  the  immediate  workplace 
environment.  
 
There was no significant difference in training methods by sector (chi-square = 2.27, 
df = 4, p = 0.686). There was however a significant size effect with 85 per cent of the 
smallest companies (with 5 employees or less) opting to informally train on the job 
(chi-square = 8.26, df = 2, p = 0.016) as compared to larger companies. Given the 
size  of  these  companies,  their  limited  human  resource  capacity  and  the  cost 
difficulties  of  releasing  staff  for  formal  training  actions  it  appears  that  little 
continuing investment was made in upskilling staff to, or on course towards, a VQ 
track recognized status once they were accomplished in the tasks required by the 
business. 
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Table 3.15 Business Training Methods (%) 
 
Method of Training  % 
Only recruit trained staff  4 
Use local training provider to accredited level  10 
Train on the job – informal   65 
Use local college to accredited level  14 
Do not train  2 
Other  5 
Business survey N=199 
 
Recognising  that  a  central  impediment  in  general  employability  and  increased 
employee  value  is  in  the  development  of  recognized  transferable  vocational 
qualifications, this weakness within the New Deal structure  could be assessed as 
limiting these. Short term, basic, unaccredited training undertaken in a very specific 
occupational environment may lead to a very narrow understanding of job range and 
the development of a  context specific vocational skills set not immediately attractive 
to other employers in that sector. Furthermore, it will do little to lock the individual 
into  a  continuing  programme  of  professional  development.  It  is  more  likely  to 
enhance basic/ core skills and do little to improve the transfer value of the employee 
beyond the entry level.  
 
This  situation  would  appear  to  reflect  a  more  general  inability  for  low  skill 
individuals to progress beyond an initial low skill low paid job placing. Only 20 per 
cent of Britons in the lowest income groups will move permanently out of low paid 
work (Nathan 2000). New Deal would appear to offer little scope for career track 
employment to improve this.  
 
Of the 35 companies recruiting 46 staff in the period of the study, only half (18) said 
that this training would lead to a recognised vocational qualification. There was no 
significant difference between sectors in training to a VQ2 level (chi-square = 0.70, 
df = 2, p = 0.70), nor by size of company (chi-square = 4.4, df = 2, p = 0.11).  
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Table 3.16 Training of New Recruits (%) 
 
Method of Training  Training to VQ level  
  No (%)  Yes (%)  Total 
Only Recruit Trained Staff  0  6  2 
Local training Provider  6  22  17 
Train on the Job  77  61  69 
Local College  6  11  12 
   N  17  18  35 
Business survey 
Given that one of the original aims of New Deal was to direct new employees into 
formal accredited training through the workplace, this would appear as an obvious 
shortcoming of the New Deal in the example  of the study  cohort. Although this 
represents a positive shift from the 25 per cent VQ training baseline reported in table 
3.15,  it  nonetheless  demonstrates  a  continuing  reluctance  on  the  part  of  small 
employers to engage with a national workplace training agenda. This is despite the 
formal condition that this training takes place and suggests a resistance to the training 
requirements associated with New Deal. 
 
The  issue  of  training  was  highlighted  in  several  case  studies  as  a  considerable 
inconvenience  given  the  short  nature  of  the  New  Deal  placement,  the  minimum 
compulsory  training  elements  of  a  VQ  led  approach  against  the  limited  time 
available,  the  difficulty  in  accessing  suitable  training  providers  and  the  general 
disruption caused to the business by having to organise and supervise training in this 
way.  
 
From these experiences, it would appear that in general terms, the small business 
approach to the training of recruits is only modestly influenced by the New Deal 
package and, as such, New Deal appears limited in its capacity to equip staff with 
industry recognised qualifications. 
 
Business Benefits 
Elam and Snape (2000), report that of the most important consideration influencing a 
business considering participation in a wage subsidy initiative is the benefit that it 
can bring to the business. Working with wage subsidies must not overly distract the 
business from its core function, divert an undue amount of time or resources or prove Employment Outcomes and Business Benefits 
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difficult to accommodate within existing business practices. Businesses expect to see 
a benefit for their effort. In the terms of wage subsidy, this benefit is most commonly 
articulated as an assisted and improved means of accessing and supporting new staff. 
Businesses requiring new and additional staff can look to wage subsidy schemes to 
alleviate the risk of recruitment through employee screening, skills matching and 
financial assistance towards employee costs (Storey 1998; Layard, Clark and Rubin 
1997; Layard 1994).  The needs of the individual employee, arriving in employment 
through such programmes, are not of central importance to the decision to participate 
 
The benefit of the New Deal was seen as its potential to improve the quality and 
quantity of labour available to the business community, the supported manner in 
which these individuals were introduced to employers and the cost compensation 
offered through the wage and training subsidy offered. Where it worked effectively, 
the New Deal approach should have strengthened the capacity of the Employment 
Service to engage with the small business community, complementing the word of 
mouth and related recruitment networks they traditionally relied on.  
 
Despite a very positive anticipation to participate in the New Deal (over 90 per cent 
of the survey businesses) and with recruitment forecast three times greater than in the 
previous three years, New Deal failed to produce any level of output close to that 
anticipated.  Businesses  simply  could  not,  or  would  not  use  the  New  Deal.  
Employment outcomes were significantly overestimated by businesses.  
 
The New Deal strategy of short, sharp employment placing, focussing on low skill, 
low pay and often short duration jobs required a degree of effort from the employer 
side that was judged as too large an investment for too limited a return. In these 
terms,  the  business  benefit  of  New  Deal  was  overstated.  Despite  a  very  positive 
reception  from  the  small  business  community,  New  Deal  became  recognised  as 
possessing similar limitations to previous wage subsidy initiatives 
 
The recruitment behaviour of small business has not been positively influenced by 
the introduction of New Deal. It would appear that small businesses are no more 
favourably disposed to the recruitment of the long-term unemployed as a result of Employment Outcomes and Business Benefits 
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New Deal. The main issues determining this situation are to be found in the lack of 
appropriate support offered by the Employment Service, the quality of recruit offered 
through  New  Deal,  the  unreliability  of  the  referral  process  and  the  element  of 
business risk presented by the long term unemployed. The commercial liability and 
additional  responsibilities  that  untrained  and  ill-prepared  employees  bring  to  a 
business may simply prove too much take on, especially where trading margins are 
thin. 
 
Given the limited element of risk perceived by employers and the inability of the 
New  Deal  to  overcome  this,  it  suggests  several  major  limitations  to  the  overall 
approach. Central to this would appear to be a poor appreciation of what employers 
look for in a job candidate and an over-optimistic assumption as to how flexible 
employers  can  be  when  dealing  with  new  staff,  particularly  those  presenting 
additional  social  and  personal  issues.  This  partly  explains  why  the  New  Deal 
approach failed to build on initial enthusiasm by way of large-scale practical action.  
 
Given the difficulties experienced with New Deal, and in previous similar initiatives, 
several fundamental issues regarding the employment of the long term unemployed 
appear, as yet, unaddressed. As has been seen from the experiences of the survey 
businesses,  New  Deal  has  not  provided  a  reliable  or  stable  supply  of  labour  of 
sufficient  quality  to  present  a  strong  enough  case  for  business  benefit.  This  has 
negatively affected the uptake, use and perception of the initiative. The underlying 
reasons for this are explored in further detail in the following chapter. Working with the New Deal 
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CHAPTER  4. WORKING WITH THE NEW DEAL  
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Introduction 
Early enthusiasm for New Deal was not realised by way of practical action. The 
number  and  quality  of  jobs  stimulated  through  New  Deal  was  far  lower  than 
expected  and  the  initiative  failed  to  establish  itself  with  the  small  business 
community  as  a  credible  method  of  recruitment.  This  was  mostly  due  to  the 
immediate difficulties encountered with the quality of the recruit offered.  
 
In addition to this, several fundamental factors surrounding the introduction of the 
New Deal also influenced levels of participation and cooperation evident from the 
business  community.  These  generally  relate  to  the  issues  of  poor  programme 
management, weak employer communication and the limited, or negligible, business 
returns in efficiency and productivity. 
 
The following chapter looks at these issues through the experiences of the businesses 
surveyed. In particular it concentrates on the central issue of how businesses have 
interpreted this policy inspired labour market initiative in the practical environment. 
It considers the issues of access to the labour market for the long term unemployed, 
the quality of recruit emerging through the New Deal and attempts to understand this 
in a changing environment where the introduction of New Deal was only one of 
many factors impacting on businesses performance.  
 
Through a discussion of the difficulties, impediments and frustrations experienced in 
recruiting through the New Deal, it reviews the New Deal effect from the perspective 
of the small business employer and explains why the New Deal model failed to build 
from an early strong enthusiasm. 
 
 
Business Stability  
The New Deal was introduced across an employer  community sensitive to many 
internal and external factors influences affecting business performance. In an effort 
to understand and account for these factors, the business survey monitored perceived 
and actual changes in business turnover and profitability. This was as an attempt to 
explain the general internal business context to which the New Deal was introduced.  Working with the New Deal 
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In addition, some interpretation of the employment trends evident in the regional 
labour markets within which the survey businesses were located, and for the most 
part traded, might help develop an understanding of the general economic trends 
evident in the   external environment at this time.  
 
In attempting to identify factors of potential instability, acknowledge environmental 
change and understand business performance, we might account for any effect these 
may have had in producing the low levels of participation and enthusiasm evidenced. 
 
Internal Factors 
The  main  purpose  of  any  business  is  to  interpret  and  manipulate  a  volatile  and 
competitive  external  business  environment  to  produce  stable  internal  business 
features capable of producing financial surplus.  
 
Small business structures based heavily on informal and personalised management 
and can produce organisations which may often not behave in planned terms.  In 
order  to  survive,  each  business  must  possess  a  unique  structure  and  production 
capacity heavily reliant on the key attributes of the core staff. To be successful, this 
core is dependent on strong interpersonal relationships and communication. In such 
small sensitive organisations, flexibility and adaptability is the key to success and 
survival.  
 
Appreciating  the  sophisticated  and  sensitive  factors  which  drive  small  business, 
measuring  performance  presents  many  methodological  issues  which  have  been 
impossible  to  account  for  in  the  relatively  limited  data  generated  by  the  survey 
conducted for this study.  However, in order to develop some understanding of how 
the survey businesses performed during the introductory period of the New Deal, a 
measure of this was attempted where the businesses were asked to comment on their 
main business trends - based on company turnover and profitability - at three main 
stages.  
 
A  simple  scoring  method  was  used  to  differentiate  between  these,  where  1  = 
anticipated decline in turnover and profitability, 2 =no change and 3 = anticipated Working with the New Deal 
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increase. This produced perceptual data offering a broad and general insight by proxy 
into  the  business  environment  in  case.  Although  by  no  means  a  fully  reliable 
indicator, it nonetheless has assisted in determining a  general business overview, 
finding a generally positive and stable commercial context. 
 
Allowing for modest changes over time and between sectors, it was found that that 
there were no significant changes evident in profitability and turnover trends 
 
Table 4.1    Business Trends as Reported over Survey Timeframe 
   
Questionnaire  N  Mean 
Baseline Questionnaire 
First question:  
Business Trends in previous two years 
199  2.42 
Baseline Questionnaire 
Second question: 
Business Trends at start of survey 
199  2.51 
Follow up Questionnaire 1:  
Business Trends after first 6 months  152  2.64 
Follow up Questionnaire 2: 
Business Trends at start of survey for those responding to 
third question 
152  2.59 
Business survey 
 
A comparison of the scores for the first two question periods showed that there was 
no  significant  difference  between  actual  and  projected  turnover  and  profitability 
trends in the sample as a whole at the start of the survey (paired t-test, t = 0.723, df = 
198 p = 0.47).  At this baseline first questionnaire, it would appear that the survey 
cohort enjoyed a relative stability in their main profitability and turnover trends over 
the two year period leading up to the introduction of the New Deal. 
 
At  no  point  in  the  survey  did  the  businesses  report  an  unduly  negative  trading 
environment.  At  the  survey  follow  up  stages,  the  stability  of  the  business  base 
appears to remain. Given that only modest and mostly positive trends in the survey 
businesses are observed, in the context of the introduction of the New Deal, we may 
think of the survey cohort as stable, as expressed in terms of a positive outlook for 
turnover and profitability.  
 
In this regard it could be said that these key indicators of business performance did 
not exhibit any obvious, negative influence on the economic prospects of the survey Working with the New Deal 
 
  61 
businesses which may have explained their reluctance to engage with the New Deal. 
As such we might observe these factors, at worst, as exercising a neutral effect on 
New Deal participation. 
 
External Factors 
The survey was conducted at a time of falling unemployment at both the local and 
national level.  
 
Table 4.2   Unemployment and Long Term Unemployment by Area and at UK   
Level 1998-2000 (%) 
 
Unemployment  Long Term Unemployment   
  1998  1999  2000  1998  1999  2000 
Area Mean  5.9  5.7  4.9  29.2  29.2  26.9 
UK Mean  4.3  4.1  3.5  26.4  24.8  21.7 
Source Nomis 2001 
Note: Long term unemployment =  12 months+ ; area mean is average of 6 study areas.  
 
 
In addition, at the national level, employment trends across Distribution and Retail 
(SIC G, H) and Community/Personal (SIC O) sectors can be viewed as generally 
stable with the range for these sectors over the time period 1998-2000 as less than 
0.4 per cent. The fall in manufacturing employment appears as more marked than 
this where a reduction of 6 per cent for this sector has resulted in a labour market 
share reduction of 1.5 per cent. Over this period 243,000 manufacturing jobs were 
lost. 
 
Table 4.3  UK Employment by Sector 1998-2000 (%) 
 
Sector  1998   1999   2000  Range 
SIC G, H –Distribution/Retail  23.7  23.8  23.6  0.2 
SIC D       Manufacturing  16.9  16.1  15.4  1.5 
SIC O      Community, Social and Personal  4.7  4.9  5.1  0.4 
Nomis 2006 
 
In absolute terms the following changes occurred where overall employment in these 
sectors increased by almost 1 million. 
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Table 4.4  UK Employees by Sector 1998-2000 
 
Sector  1998   1999   2000  +/-  Range 
SIC G, H – Distribution/Retail  5,880,000  5,973,000  6,063,000  +183,000  +3% 
SIC D       Manufacturing  4,196,000  4,050,000  3,953,000  -243,000  -6% 
SIC O      Community, Social 
and Personal 
1,166,000  1,254,000  1,306,000  +140,000  +12% 
UK Labour Force   24,731,000  25,089,000  25,658,000  +927,000  +3.7% 
Nomis 2006 
 
This  increasing  labour  force  masks  the  percentage  decline  of  manufacturing  in 
overall terms. At the regional level five out of the six areas report a fall in this sector. 
 
Table 4.5   UK Employment by Main Sector and Government Office Area 1998 
-2000  (%) 
 
SIC 
 
Distribution+Retail 
SIC (G,H) 
Manufacturing 
(SIC D) 
Community, social and 
Personal (SIC O) 
Year  1998  1999  2000  1998  1999  2000  1998  1999  2000 
London  18.3  18.1  18.2  10.1  9.9  8.4  9.8  8.5  9.5 
South East  20.0  20.8  19.8  15.7  15  14.6  6.6  5.6  5.4 
South West  21.9  20.8  20.7  16.1  16.6  16.7  6.6  5.6  5.4 
Wales  20.1  18.2  17.7  20.6  20.2  18.5  5.5  5.1  6.0 
Scotland   19.8  20.2  20.0  16.8  14.9  14.3  5.5  5.8  6.2 
Nomis 2001 
 
With  the  exception  of  manufacturing,  the  general  economic  and  employment 
situation  over  the  duration  of  the  survey  period  may  be  regarded  as  a  positive 
business environment. Short term  and long term unemployment fell in all of the 
study  areas  and  at  the  national  level.    Even  where  there  has  been  a  substantial 
decrease in the number of manufacturing employees, this sector has the strongest 
conversion rate of New Deal intent to New Deal recruitment with around half of 
anticipated recruitment occurring in this way – as shown in the previous chapter in 
Table 3.13 :Recruitment Behaviour by Main Sector 
 
The business stability evident and the increase in employment prospects over this 
period  provided  a  generally  receptive  environment  for  the  application  of  an 
employment-based initiative of the New Deal type. Given an environment where the 
degree of business risk associated with employment through the New Deal would not 
appear to be exaggerated by additional external and internal business factors, the 
introduction of the New Deal wage subsidy might have been expected to perform as 
intended,  creating  employment  opportunities  for  the  long-term  unemployed  and Working with the New Deal 
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encouraging businesses in the recruitment of this group. However, as we have seen, 
this  does  not  appear  to  have  happened.  Despite  an  increase  in  employment 
opportunity, there appears to be no apparent connection between this and recruitment 
for the survey businesses. The New Deal has failed to make its anticipated impact.  
 
Clearly  this  situation  has  been  influenced  by  other  factors  surrounding  the 
implementation of the initiative. The following section outlines what these factors 
have been. 
 
 
Limited Attraction 
Given  the  skills  set  and  employability  traits  of  the  typical  New  Deal  candidate, 
labour market access is likely to concentrate on entry-level employment. (Fothergill 
2001; Leggard et al.  2000; Atkinson, Giles and Meager.  1998, Green 1998; Hasluck 
1999; Tavistock Institute 1999). 
 
The  New  Deal  was  designed  to  assist  businesses  in  their  recruitment  needs  by 
providing  a  new  supply  of  additional  labour.  This  flow  of  new  labour  would  be 
stimulated  by  wage  subsidy  and  training  inducements  designed  to  offset  the 
additional cost and inconvenience of employment.  A financial inducement effect 
would attract employers towards using the New Deal. Additionally, the fixed wage 
subsidy associated with New Deal may prove relatively more attractive in lower pay 
employment  as  being  of  greater  relative  value  to  the  employer  and  helping  to 
reinforce the use of the subsidy in these circumstances. 
 
Financial Inducement 
From  a  position  of  initial  optimism,  the  realities  of  working  with  the  New  Deal 
model  and  the  issues  presented  by  the  potential  employee  starts  to  affect  initial 
employer  enthusiasm.  In  a  real  setting,  its  perceived  initial  value  is  tested  and 
becomes  of  less  worth  then  originally  anticipated.  Most  small  businesses 
participating as case studies in the business survey reported that, in a strict business 
sense, recruitment through the New Deal offered only, at best, a minimal benefit. The 
main  issues  arising    through  this    are  that  small  businesses  (especially Working with the New Deal 
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owner/employers)  can  be  very  asset  precious  and  wary  of  external  staff.  The 
disruption caused by a new employee in a small business is likely to outweigh the 
benefit and that a wage subsidy and training allowance is unlikely to compensate for 
this disruption 
 
In general terms employers at this end of the labour market appear less concerned 
with specific vocational skills and more interested in core skills such as attitude, 
reliability, motivation and literacy/numeracy (Hasluck 2000; Hasluck 1998). These 
are  the  personal  attributes  most  commonly  observed  as  lacking  in  the  long  term 
unemployed  (Campbell  2000;  Hillage  and  Pollard  1999;  Crighton  1998).    Where 
these basic core skills are underdeveloped, a simple financial inducement may be of 
little compensation and unlikely to convince the employer as to the value of agreeing 
a New Deal placement. 
 
Quality of Recruit 
In times of strong labour demand, as is evident around the introduction of the New 
Deal,  the more able unemployed may be  recruited directly to employment ,leaving 
the more complex cases for the New Deal to work with. Of the employers responding 
to the business survey, quality of recruit was the fundamental difficulty adversely 
affecting their ability to work with the New Deal. The trade off between accessing 
subsidised  labour  and  the  weak  state  of  work  preparedness  that  many  such 
individuals possessed, questioned the overall value of recruitment in this way. Here 
quality of recruit refers mainly to poor employability because of  weak core skills. 
 
We have seen that, in broad terms the majority of businesses expected to use New 
Deal as a means of employment recruitment and almost half did not foresee any 
difficulty  in  working  in  this  way.  However,  this  anticipated  activity  did  not 
materialise, mainly through the issue of insufficient quality of labour supply and the 
weakness of the systems set in place to compensate for this. 
 
Employer access to a sufficient quality and quantity of labour formed the central 
relationship within the New Deal. The support and resources provided by the New 
Deal to meet the needs of the employer was the critical relationship upon which the Working with the New Deal 
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effectiveness of the initiative was to be built. From the survey evidence offered, this 
relationship appears as slight if at all evident. Despite stable economic environment 
and  suitable  recruitment  conditions,  little  has  been  created  by  way  of  additional 
employment in the survey businesses over the duration of their early involvement 
with the New Deal.  General recruitment was less than 30 per cent of anticipated and 
New Deal recruitment at only 10 per cent of what the businesses themselves had 
forecast.  
 
The sensitivity of the recruitment process for small businesses would appear to resist 
the attempts made by New Deal to influence this. After the enthusiasm expressed 
with the principle of the New Deal, where only around 20 per cent of employers 
thought  that  the  quality  of  recruit  might  be  an  issue,  the  operational  reality  of 
working with the New Deal and the labour supply that it stimulated, produced an 
entirely different view of this. When revisited some six months later, the expectation 
of recruit quality as an issue had been realised at a rate of over three times that 
anticipated  with    only  one  in  eight  of  the  survey  businesses  reporting  that  they 
experienced no operational problems in their work with the New Deal (table 4.6).  
 
Of the businesses participating in both interviews; using a like-for-like comparison of 
those respondents featuring in both survey stages, the increase in the numbers citing 
quality  of  recruit  and  the  decrease  in  those  citing  no  operational  problems  was 
significant (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z = 7.29 p < 0.01). Within this, there were no 
significant differences across sectors nor across companies of differing sizes.  
 
Table 4.6 Anticipated and Actual Difficulties in involvement with ND (%) 
 
Difficulties  Anticipated   Actual  
None  45.0  13.2 
Quality of recruit  19.5  62.5 
Poor support/bureaucracy  16.1  5.9 
Training commitment  9.4  2.0 
Financial commitment  2.7  2.6 
Will not participate / other  7.4  13.8 
Total (N)  152  152 
Business survey 
Note: The participating businesses reduced from 199 at the first interview stage to 152 at the second 
purely due to difficulties in maintaining contact. 
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There were no significant differences across sectors (chi-square = 10.84, df = 6   p = 
0.094) or across companies of differing sizes. (chi-square = 3.62, df = 4   p = 0.46). 
 
Table 4.7 Main Issues with New Deal to Date by Employment Sector (%) 
 
Issues  Distribution 
and Retail 
Manufacturing  Community, Social 
and Personal 
Other 
None  16.7  5.1  11.8  10.7 
Quality of recruit  70.8  59.0  52.9  71.4 
Other   12.5  35.9  35.3  17.9 
Total (N)  49  39  35  29 
Business survey 
 
The  reality  of  working  with  the  New  Deal  does  not  appear  to  justify  initial 
enthusiasm. Following from the work of Dean, McNeil and Melrose. (2003) Hasluck 
(2001); Campbell (2000); NAO (2002); FSB (2000); Metcalf (2000); Meager and 
Metcalf (1998) and Atkinson (1997) it would appear that employers dealing with the 
previously unemployed individuals referred by New Deal have their enthusiasm and 
interest  curbed  when  faced  with  the  reality  of  working  with  potential  employees 
presenting additional workplace needs, most commonly in terms of poor reliability, 
weak motivation and basic literacy/numeracy. 
 
Initial enthusiasm and interest in working with the New Deal was tempered by the 
realities  of  poor  quality  referrals,  the  organisational  disruption,  and  call  on 
management time and cost implications that these have on the smooth functioning of 
the business. Case study evidence from 27 businesses followed up from the business 
survey  confirms  that  even  where  New  Deal  has  led  to  successful  employment, 
employer impressions are that it is a difficult way to recruit and retain staff. 
 
The  simplicity  of  the  New  Deal  job  matching  and  support  programme  appears 
limited in its capacity to address the issues affecting the small business employer. It 
also assumes a simple employment demand, irrespective of the local economy it is 
based in. Several further key limitations from this are suggested in the following 
section. 
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A Mismatch of Needs 
In its view of small business involvement, the New Deal design appears as hopeful 
rather than targeted. Only 31 per cent of general employment vacancies are promoted 
by  the  Employment  Service  and  can  be  considered  in  the  New  Deal  (Bunt, 
McAndrew  and  Keuchal  2007).  In  addition,  the  survey  businesses  identified  that 
around one third of their job vacancies were at the entry-level end of the labour 
market (defined as initial assessment/basic skills).  
 
Insufficient Demand and Restricted Opportunity 
New  Deal  was  introduced  to  local  labour  markets  where  the  majority  of  job 
vacancies were traded outwith the Employment Service network. Most of these jobs 
were advertised  in other ways with the majority of these being through informal 
‘word  of  mouth’  networks.  We  have  already  seen  the  preference  of  the  small 
business  to  recruit  through  these  networks  and  how  difficult  it  is  to  route  these 
vacancies through the more formal New Deal approach.  
 
An  enduring  reliance  on  word  of  mouth  recruitment  presented  a  fundamental 
mismatch  between  employer  recruitment  preferences  and  the  New  Deal  labour 
supply, translating as a shortage of suitable New Deal vacancies. Where vacancies 
did arise, many were ill matched to the skills set of the typical New Deal candidate. 
This insufficient availability of appropriate labour market opportunities may be seen 
as an additional complication for the introduction of the New Deal (Crighton 1998; 
Theodore 1998). This has been identified as the issue of ‘jobs gap’ in New Deal. 
(Pugh 1998; Snape 1998).  
 
The subsidised jobs option was geared to help those unable to secure employment in 
the open market. This suggests candidates of limited employability unattractive to 
employers. The evidence base suggests that, in the main, employers will not readily 
recruit from this cohort. (Auspos and Riccio 1999; Sheehan and Tomlinson 1998; 
Finn 1997; Gardiner 1997). This is reinforced by the employer experiences observed 
in the business survey. Working with the New Deal 
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Labour Availability and Skills Shortages 
Where labour demand was evident in the survey businesses, a New Deal approach 
was often inappropriate due to a pressing need for qualified/experienced/skilled staff. 
This re-emphasises the observed shortage of suitable vacancies becoming available. 
Alongside the general issue of poor quality and low employability recruits, it further 
suggests the mismatch in supply and demand. The following table sets out the main 
reasons for employers rejecting New Deal candidates. 
 
Table 4.8 New Deal Rejection and the Need for Skilled Staff by Main 
Occupational Sector  
 
  Poor Quality of 
Recruit 
Totally 
Unsuitable  
Immediate Need for 
skilled staff 
Total  
Manufacturing  18    16  34 
Construction  6    6  12 
Retail  12    20  32 
Personal services  16  2  14  32 
N  24  1  27  52 
Business survey 
 
Quality of labour appears as the single most significant impediment to progress in the 
New Deal. The small business group featured in the survey report a limited number 
of entry level vacancies suitable to the New Deal labour supply. Only 6 per cent of 
Employment  Service  vacancies  handled  were  converted  to  New  Deal  placements 
(Bunt, McAndrew and Keuchal 2007).  
 
Just as significant, however, are the other vacancies they do report which call for 
more highly skilled staff. In this instance, the New Deal model would appear even 
more remote as a solution to employer recruitment needs. The main skills shortages 
reported are in the professional and managerial levels of the labour market, which 
traditionally operate internal labour markets outside the reach of the Employment 
Service and the New Deal. (Green 1998, Fothergill 2001).   
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Table 4.9 Recruitment Difficulty - Reported by Sector 
 
Skills area  % 
Initial assessment/basic skills  32 
Professional Occupations  37 
Science and Engineering Professionals  16 
Secretarial  8 
Other  8 
N=88  88 
Business survey 
 
There were no significant differences in reported recruitment difficulty across sectors 
but there were interesting and significant differences across companies of differing 
sizes (chi-square test, chi-square = 49.74, df= 8, p <0.001).  
 
Three quarters of the smallest companies had found problems recruiting at the very 
basic skills levels.  As has emerged previously, the smallest companies have the most 
informal recruitment methods and appear to lack sufficient organisational capacity to 
cope with skills shortages and recruitment issues. In the business survey it is these 
companies, which appear to have the greatest numbers of entry-level positions and 
the greatest difficulties in filling these. This is a potential support area that New Deal 
would appear to neglect; doing little to ameliorate this and suggesting a fundamental 
mismatch between the  recruitment needs of these businesses, the mechanics of a 
recruitment process and the capacity of the New Deal to support these.  
 
This blunt approach of the New Deal appears insensitive to the areas of the labour 
market which might have proved most receptive i.e. entry levels skills shortage and 
traditional ‘word of mouth’ vacancies. The insensitivity of its approach appears to 
have compromised some labour market opportunities, which might otherwise have 
proved successful.  
 
Case study evidence suggests that where small business initially identified New Deal 
as  a  possible  solution  to  its  difficulties  in  recruiting  staff  and  how  this  situation 
quickly became unworkable. This was mainly due to shortages of core personal and 
social skills, as well as specific vocational skills and a lack of confidence in the 
Employment  Service  referral  process  which  did  not  appear  sensitive  to  or 
sophisticated enough to account for the stated needs of the business.  Working with the New Deal 
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New Deal does not reflect the recruitment needs and practices of the small business 
community.  It  has  not  extended  to  include  the  word  of  mouth  vacancies  which 
dominate the entry level job market, nor can it provide support to skills shortages in 
the local  economy.  Further, it does not appear  to posses a specific  and sensitive 
intervention strategy capable of responding to employer recruitment need, especially 
at  the  micro  end  of  the  small  business  spectrum  where  limited  organisational 
capacity appears to frustrate participation. 
 
 
Limitations, Frustrations and Impediments 
27  in-depth  case  studies  were  undertaken  in  order  to  complement,  expand  and 
illustrate on the survey responses . In the main these helped establish the specific 
difficulties  experienced  in  workings  with  the  New  Deal  and  the  issues  small 
businesses encountered when recruiting from the long-term   unemployed 
 
From this evidence base, New Deal has inefficiently attempted an over-general and 
unfocussed  approach  which  may  have  been  more  successful  if  its  planning  and 
targeting of effort had been considered more carefully. It attempted to work with a 
very narrow pool of low quality labour, could not address employer skills shortage 
issues  for  small  businesses  and,  in  effect,  levered  inappropriate  individuals 
artificially into a labour market that could not absorb them.  
 
This suggests a fundamental misunderstanding of how these labour markets work 
and confirms the belief of many in the business survey that the support role of the 
Employment Service is not sufficiently developed to consider the direct needs of 
participating business when recruiting through New Deal. 
 
The Role of the Employment Service 
Much of the initial enthusiasm to work with the New Deal was due to its successful 
promotion  to  the  small  business  community  by  the  Employment  Service.  This 
promotion described a model which included a tailored support relationship for the 
employment placement. However, much of this appeared built on an assumption of 
simple recruitment needs and an optimism around the issues likely to arise; expecting Working with the New Deal 
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that  a  light  and  general  level  of  assistance  would  be  adequate  to  facilitate  a 
successful employment outcome. In the experiences of the survey businesses, this 
optimism was not realised and the weaknesses of the Employment Service quickly 
became apparent as they struggled to cope with the complexity of the individuals 
referred to them against the expectations of the employers providing placements.  
 
A  common  observation  from  the  case  study  businesses  was  that  the  New  Deal 
Personal Advisers appeared to lack experience, and in many cases interest, in the 
needs of the participating businesses. Their interest appeared more geared to simple 
placement targets as opposed to successful and sustainable employment outcomes. 
Their involvement appeared front-loaded, short-term and ill equipped to deal with 
the  complexities  often  generated  by  the  New  Deal  candidate.  The  simple 
employment strategy underpinning the New Deal was not sufficiently equipped to 
consider the structural level social and economic issues encountered (Beatty et al. 
2007; ODPM 2005; Ritchie et al. 2005; Lawless 2004). 
 
Across  these  experiences,  the  Employment  Service  did  not  appear  adequately 
resourced or experienced to help the small business community deal with the issues 
generated  by  their  participation  and  cooperation.  A  weak  referral  and  support 
mechanism effectively passed risk to the employer. In this, an imbalance quickly 
developed between the expectation of how New Deal would work (as promoted to 
employers) and the reality of this in a field setting (as experienced by employers).  
 
The wage subsidy effect anticipated by the introduction of the New Deal employer 
option was not realised. The quality of the individual recruit referred and the limited 
support  subsequently  made  available  by  the  Employment  Service  were  the  main 
causes of unsuccessful placement. Alongside this, the  weakness of the supporting 
administration and management of the referral process and the  apparent lack of local 
flexibility  and  discretion  to  meet  the  expressed  needs  of  local  business  further 
undermined the credibility of the initiative. A common observation was that the New 
Deal    exploited  employer  goodwill  ,  in  pursuit  of  centrally  determined  national 
targets. Working with the New Deal 
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Administrative Burden 
Small  businesses  are  sensitive  to  regulatory  requirement,  statutory  reporting  and 
general issues of bureaucracy (FSB 2000). Additional difficulties were reported in 
the  bureaucracy  and  management  responsibilities  generated  by  the  New  Deal, 
whether this is through monitoring, assessment, progress recording, health and safety 
compliance or any other administrative requirements of participation. Although an 
effort was made to keep such administration to a minimum, it nonetheless featured as 
an unwelcome burden to many of the participant businesses. Whether the burden of 
New  Deal  in  this  respect,  was  real  or  perceived,  it  still  emerged  as  an  irritating 
feature.  
 
In  the  business  survey,  all  stated  that  the  immediate  operational  needs  and 
established working practices of the business would always come first and that there 
was  only  a  limited  degree  of  latitude  that  they  could  exercise  when  New  Deal 
recruits did not fit well with these. Where administrative burden started to interfere 
with  the  operations  of  the  business,  this  introduced  another  good  reason  for 
employers to choose against working with the New Deal. 
 
Commercial Liability 
Businesses that had had a negative experience in working with New Deal were more 
likely  to  stress  the  commercial  risk  and  liability  that  untrained  and  ill-prepared 
employees can present. Several felt that this risk was simply too much to ask – and 
indeed where a small business trading on very tight margins is asked to consider the 
additional responsibilities of a New Deal recruit this may simply prove too much to 
take on. Most employers, consulted through the survey, felt recruitment of the long-
term unemployed added additional risk to the recruitment process. In addition, the 
weak referral processes of the New Deal could not help them assess the degree of  
this risk.  
 
Employers report that New Deal relies too heavily on the goodwill. Even where this 
is  evident  it  is  still  no  guarantee  of  successful  placement.  All  of  the  case  study 
businesses  reported  that  Employment  Service  support  to  the  individual  work Working with the New Deal 
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placements was inadequate given the given the sometimes serious, social, personal 
and vocational issues presented by the New Deal referral 
 
Expectation to Train  
The expectation to provide training towards VQ2 accreditation as part of the New 
Deal was a further inconvenience to the many small businesses. Many had never 
worked in this way, having always relied on more informal training approaches.  
 
Case  study  evidence  supports  a  view  that  the  effort  required  to  induct,  train, 
supervise and encourage a new employee disrupted the rhythm of the small team 
approach, resulted in lost production time and presented as of limited, negligible or 
negative value in cost benefit terms. In several cases, the training requirement in 
some occupational areas exposed some employers to a training  commitment longer 
than the New Deal support period. In many case study cases, even when a seemingly 
suitable  candidate  was  introduced  to  the  workforce  through  the  New  Deal,  the 
sensitivity and fragility of even the most sympathetic working environment made this 
unsustainable. Employer goodwill and candidate suitability are still not enough to 
support a positive New Deal impact. 
 
 
Explaining the New Deal Effect 
For the survey businesses, the  introduction of the New Deal initiative did genuinely 
appear to present an opportunity to adapt traditional recruitment practices. However, 
as we have seen, this did not translate as employment growth or enthusiasm for the 
operational aspects of the New Deal.  In terms of building a proactive labour market 
re-engagement  for  the  long-term  unemployed  based  on  employer  responses  to 
financial  inducements,  New  Deal    failed  to  productively  connect  with  the  small 
business community. 
 
Making the long term unemployed more attractive to employers through the New 
Deal appears as a simplistic approach founded on a naive expectation that  employer 
goodwill alone would prove sufficient. The experiences of employers working with 
the New Deal demonstrates a degree of dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the Working with the New Deal 
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quality  of  the  labour  provided  and  the  support  available  from  the  Employment 
Service  
 
From these experiences and observations it becomes apparent that the limited effects 
of Government sponsored programmes encouraging the recruitment of the long term 
unemployed carry through into the New Deal where similar trepidation, reluctance 
and wariness endure on the part of the small business employer. This is particularly 
apparent where potential employees are referred as part of a process which seems to 
involve no meaningful preselection of candidate for referral and is underpinned by 
the use of benefits sanction to coerce participation.  
 
Following  from  the  work  of  Dean,  McNeil  and  Melrose  (2003),  Hasluck 
(2001),Campbell (2000), Meager and Metcalf (1998) and Atkinson (1997) it appears 
that  employers dealing with the previously unemployed individuals referred by New 
Deal, displayed the same  wariness of engaging with this type of individual as had 
been experienced in previous similar labour market interventions. It would appear 
that New Deal is identified as the latest in a continuing series of these. 
 
Throughout these interventions, wage subsidies have proved to be a relatively weak 
attraction to employers and, as in the case of New Deal, sanctioned individuals are 
viewed as of dubious worth to the employer community. This is especially so when 
they  appear  as  levered  into  labour  markets  offering  few  suitable  vacancies  with 
employers  expected  to  accommodate  their  standing  recruitment  practices  to 
accommodate them. 
 
Employability  
New Deal was based on the premise that by improving the employability of the long 
term  unemployed,  employers  would  show  a  greater  interest  in  them  as  potential 
employees. In the experience of the businesses surveyed for this study, New Deal has 
done little to make this happen. Employability, using Hillage and Pollard’s (1999) 
definition, has not been improving as is shown below 
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1. Assets  - The poor personal and economic assets displayed by the typical New 
Deal referral 
 
New Deal recruits were viewed as lacking the personal and vocational assets sought 
by  employers.  Experience  has  shown  that  employers,  although  not  averse  to  the 
notion of recruiting the long term unemployed, find the practical issues raised as 
distracting to their business purpose. It appears that New Deal does little to address 
these inadequacies, with specific reference to core skills, and in this respect may be 
regarded  as  having  little  to  contribute  in  the  development  of  individual 
employability.  Employers  initially  interested  in  the  New  Deal  quickly  lose  this 
interest when they realise the poor personal, social and economic assets brought to 
the  workplace  by  the  New  Deal  candidate.  Dean,  McNeil  and  Melrose  (2003) 
Hasluck  (2001);  Campbell  (2000);  NAO  (2002);  FSB  (2000);  Metcalf  (2000); 
Meager and Metcalf (1998) and Atkinson (1997) 
 
2. Deployment - The insular nature of the local labour markets where New Deal has 
concentrated its efforts 
 
As New Deal concentrates it recruitment efforts at the low skill/low pay end of the 
employment spectrum and has a spatial focus in those areas of high unemployment, 
mobility of labour is required to bring the unemployed and job opportunities closer 
together. However, typical low-income workers do not demonstrate high degrees of 
labour market mobility (Pugh 1998). Therefore issues arise around the efficiency of 
New Deal as it attempts to prepare individuals for employment in jobs markets which 
are local, low skill, low pay and in short supply or towards job markets further afield 
to which they will not travel. This has been identified as the issue of ‘jobs gap’ in 
New Deal (Pugh 1998; Snape 1998; Theodore 1998). Furthermore, the inability of 
New  Deal  to  adequately  break  into  the  very  important  word  of  mouth  networks 
governing access to the end of the labour market is also shown to compromise its 
effect. (Fothergill 2001; Campbell 2000;Lee 1999; Green 1998;Meager and Metcalf 
1998; Fielder 1992)  
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3. Presentation  - The manner in which the New Deal managing agent (Employment 
Service) has presented the New Deal candidate to the employer. 
 
The  individual’s  ability  to  connect  with  job  related  information  and  use  this  to 
communicate with potential employers is a critical aspect of the job seeking exercise. 
The Employment Service has undertaken the role of broker in this. However, the 
support made available by them for the New Deal is regarded as a main weakness of 
the initiative, second only to the quality of recruit. This has undermined confidence 
in the initiative and has proved to be a key obstacle in engaging employers (Hasluck 
and  Green  2007).  This  points  to  a  general  dissatisfaction  with  the  support  made 
available,  does  not  appear  to  engender  employer  confidence  in  the  system  and 
undermines the potential effect of the overall approach. 
 
4. Circumstances - The enduring nature of reservation wages, benefits dependency 
and social impediments to labour market access. 
 
Despite  its  efforts  to  convince  the  long  term  unemployed  as  to  the  social  and 
economic benefits of employment, the tendency within New Deal to focus on entry 
level, low quality, low paid work set against the security of existing benefits income 
produces a disincentive to work in this way (Dickens 2001; Campbell 2000; Peck 
2000;  Hillage  and  Pollard  1999;  Crighton  1998;  Strawn  1998;  Theodore  1998; 
Hasluck 1996). The social and economic status of employment may be lower in such 
communities, making such approaches less credible (Ritchie, Casebourne and Rick 
2005).  The  insecurity  associated  with  this  together  with  the  marginal  financial 
benefits  act  as  a  disincentive  to  participation  (McCormack  2002).  Without  a 
sufficiently strong incentive to participate New Deal is unlikely to prove attractive. 
Finally, the need for a coercive approach to New Deal participation would suggest a 
low rate of natural attraction. 
 
In overall terms, using these four key indicators, New Deal has done little to address 
the central components of personal employability. The New Deal approach may be 
viewed as a blunt instrument when attempting to account for the complexities of the 
communities and individuals it is most closely focussed on. Employers are wary of Working with the New Deal 
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recruiting from the long term unemployed. This is especially so when their control 
over this process and prior knowledge of the candidate is limited. The experiences of 
the employers in the survey group do not reflect any real change of attitude in this 
respect. Indeed, when asked specifically to comment on this issue at the final stage of 
the field research very few reported New Deal as having any significant impact on 
their traditional means of recruitment only 5 per cent of respondents felt that it had 
any positive effect (n=97). 
 
Despite the initial welcome given to New Deal by these businesses, a reluctance to 
consider the New Deal recruitment process as a credible alternative to the traditional 
means  of  recruitment  may  indicate  the  true  difficulty  of  altering  small  business 
recruitment behaviour through the use of an externally devised and applied model.  
 
Even where some businesses connected directly, proactively and positively with all 
of key New Deal aims, working frustrations interrupted this intent. The sheer range 
of  complicating  factors,  ambitious  targeting  and  naïve  understanding  of  business 
needs produced many difficulties which reduced the perceived value of the initiative.  
 
The key points here were that the Employment Service did not fully understand the 
needs  of  their  business  and  were  unable,  or  unwilling,    to  pre-select  those  most 
appropriate candidates. From this, the Employment Service was unable to relate to 
the  needs  of  this  business  and  a    credibility  gap  emerged  very  quickly  between 
employers and the administration of   the New Deal by the Employment Service.  
 
In  general,  although  there  was  a  consensus  that  the  relative  risk  of  recruiting 
unemployed individuals should not be a significant disincentive for businesses to 
participate  in  the  New  Deal.  Long  term  unemployed  individuals  represent  an 
acknowledged, small but manageable, risk which with the correct support, enough 
time and encouragement should yield a return to the recruiting business for the effort 
invested. However, this is very much an ‘in principle’ position as indicated by the 
high rates of initial interest not carried through into practice. It would appear that 
although  small  businesses  are  not  averse  to  the  principle  of  the  New  Deal,  and 
similar  initiatives,  the  supporting  framework  required  to  protect  their  operational Working with the New Deal 
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interests is not sufficiently developed. New Deal has not introduced the full set of 
conditions necessary to encourage stronger employer involvement. 
 
The imbalance of risk loading towards employers and the inconvenience evident in 
working  with  New  Deal  recruits  were  the  most  likely  factors  influencing  an 
employer’s decision to withdraw from participation. A range of subtle and delicate 
business  factors  combined  to  confound  the  simplicity  of  the  wage  subsidy 
hypothesis.  Here, most felt that the burden placed on employers by this arrangement 
was unreasonable, disproportionate and incompatible with the immediate needs of 
the business. The realities of recruiting and running a business often conflicted with 
the ideal of the New Deal.  
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Introduction 
It has been observed that against an optimistic initial assessment of the New Deal, 
small employers have found the operational dimension to be quite different from that 
anticipated,  with  a  limited  range  and  quality  of  jobs  created.  These  experiences 
reflect  those  of  the  employers  who  worked  with  previous,  similar  wage  subsidy 
interventions (Dean, McNeil and Melrose 2003;Hasluck 1999, 2000, 2001;Campbell 
2000;Meager and Metcalf 1998;Theodore 1998).   This suggests that the decision for 
an employer to recruit through such mechanisms is as complex and difficult, if not 
more so, than the decision to return to work for the long term unemployed. 
 
We  have  seen  that  the  combined  effect  of  wage  subsidies,  within  the  context  of 
welfare reform, displays limited potential to effectively engage the small employer 
community. A reluctance to engage employers in the design of New Deal, offers a 
weak platform on which to build a high volume initiative providing economic and 
social impact. This has arisen despite the experiences of similar earlier initiatives in 
Australia and the USA reporting the critical importance of acknowledging employer 
needs as the main success factor (Finn 1999).  
 
Reintegrating  the  unemployed  to  the  labour  market  requires  a  considered  and 
structured approach, which relies on more than simple employment (ODPM 2005; 
Ritchie  et  al.  2005;  Lawless  2004).  Little  has  been  done  through  New  Deal  to 
recognise and compensate for the main structural level social and economic causes of 
unemployment.  This  has  inevitably  frustrated  its  establishment  as  a  credible  jobs 
strategy.  
 
Small business employers are not attracted to the New Deal wage subsidy approach 
as a simple labour supply model (Hales et al. 2000). Even when they have been, 
where large numbers of employees places have been generated, the main experience 
has been of very high deadweight and very low additional employment generated 
(Hasluck 2001; Meager and Evans 1998; Beatty et al. 1997; Atkinson and Meager 
1994; OECD 2001). 
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The New Deal effort in these circumstances is based on a hopeful and simplistic 
understanding  of  how  small  businesses  behave.  New  Deal  may  have  been  more 
productive if it sought to better understand this behaviour. Developments in labour 
market  re-integration  stemming  from  the  New  Deal  must  learn  from  these 
experiences if their aims are to be realised.  
 
Since the introduction of New Deal major changes have occurred in the UK labour 
market.  This  chapter  reviews  these  changes  and  introduces  the  refinements  in 
intervention attempted.  From this it observes the recurring factors which confound 
their efforts and suggests how future modifications and refinement can realistically 
and successfully address the long standing difficulties of reintegrating the long term 
unemployed in the labour market through private employers.   
 
Employment Growth and Labour Supply 
Since its introduction in 1998 and up to 2006, the New Deal has operated in an 
environment of reducing short term and long-term unemployment, evidenced by  
 
•  A 46 per cent reduction in unemployment across the six areas of the business 
survey 
•  A 37 per cent fall in unemployment across the UK 
•  A 49 per cent fall in long term unemployment across the six business survey 
areas, and 
•  A 42 per cent reduction in long-term unemployment for the UK as a whole. 
 
 
These  trends  of  reducing  unemployment  and  long  term  unemployment  suggest  a 
buoyant labour market where employment opportunities are improving. Over this 
timeframe unemployment levels have fallen significantly. This is supported by an 
accompanying rise in the national employment rate to around 75 per cent (Dewson 
2005). The total workforce increase over this period is 4.1 Million with over 50 per 
cent of this (2.2 Million) coming from increased female participation. Overall, the 
UK employment rate is at its highest level in over 30 years (Pissarides 2006). This Effective Intervention 
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appears  as  a  fairly  large  scale  re-ordering  of  the  workforce  resulting  in  larger 
numbers of individuals available for work.  
 
Table 5.1  Total Employment (Millions) and Employment Rate for Working 
Age People 1997-2006 
 
1997  2000  2003  2006  Change  Year 
No.  %  No.  %  No.  %  No.  %  No.  % 
Male  13.7  78  15.0  79.4  15.0  79.3  15.6  78.8  1.9  +13.8 
Female  11.2  67.4  11.7  69.2  12.0  69.9  13.4  70.3  2.2  +19.3 
Total Number in 
UK Workforce 
24.9  72.8  26.4  74.6  27.1  74.9  29.0  74.6  4.1  +16.3 
Source: Nomis 2006 
 
The main drivers for these positive shifts in the labour market have been through 
increased economic activity in several key sub  groups, especially in the 50+ age 
groups.  
 
Table 5.2 Economic Activity Rates (%) 
 
Year  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  Change 
16-19  54.3  53.2  52.3  52.1  50.7  50.2  58.0  57.1  +5.0% 
16-19 Male  -  53.6  52.1  52.1  50.0  49.1  59.0  57.7  +7.6% 
50 - retirement  65.3  66.3  67.1  68.1  68.4  69.2  72.2  72.6  +11.0% 
50+ Male  -  42.1  42.5  43.1  43.3  44.1  46.1  46.2  +9.7% 
50+ Female  -  27.7  28.4  29.1  29.5  30.2  31.5  32.1  +15.8% 
Source Nomis 
1998 Labour Force Survey. No gender breakdown available 
1999 – 2003 Local Area Labour Force Survey, 2004 – 2005 Annual Population Survey 
 
Within these upward trends, there are reported increases in employment rates of +11 
per cent for the disabled and  +12 per cent for lone parents. The main decrease in 
labour market activity has been seen in the lowest qualified groups of the labour 
market where workforce rates have declined -7 per cent over the same timeframe 
(Bivand 2006a).  
 
Employers have been recruiting from the unemployed. However, this has been driven 
by very high labour demand rather than as a direct consequence of the New Deal. 
Employers will naturally recruit the most employable and will do this through direct 
recruitment or through the Gateway stage of the New Deal  - before the employment 
option and its wage subsidy, planned as 40 per cent of all referrals. Where demand 
pressures build beyond this, employers find themselves dealing with the subsidised Effective Intervention 
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job option of the New Deal; where the most problematic individuals are found, in 
terms of preparedness for employment.  
 
New Deal Employment 
Government figures report almost 3 million participants across the main New Deal, 
and Employment Zone, initiatives since their introduction. About 40 per cent of this 
activity was undertaken with the youngest age group, with the 25+ and lone parent 
groups representing about a quarter each of the total. 
 
Table 5.3 New Deal Starters/Registrants and Job Outcomes by Gender.  
Cumulative to October 2006 (Thousands) 
 
Programme  Participants  Leavers to Jobs 
  Male  Female  Total  Male  Female  Total 
New Deal – YP  781  364  1,145  509  201  710 
New Deal 25+  544  116  660  231  47  278 
New Deal Lone Parents  41  686  727  24  458  482 
New Deal for Disabled     144  86  230  77  47  124 
Total  1,510  1,252  2,762  841  753  1,594 
Source DWP 2007     
 
Around 3 million advertised vacancies are notified to Job centres in a given year  - 
37  per  cent  of  all  advertised  vacancies  (Bunt,  McAndrew  and  Keuchal  2007) 
suggesting perhaps 8 million or so open vacancies in a given year across the UK 
(Gadenne 2006). However, New Deal reports only 1,500,000 leavers to jobs from an 
estimated total of 24,000,000 jobs processed by the Employment Service between 
1998 -2006 – 6 per cent.  This low conversion figure of New Deal opportunities from 
general  Employment  Service  vacancies  can  be  attributed  back  the  weak 
employability  of  New  Deal  candidates.  Such  individuals  are  unattractive  to 
employers who will not readily recruit from this cohort. (Auspos and Riccio 1999; 
Sheehan  and  Tomlinson  1998;  Finn  1997;  Gardiner  1997).  Despite  the  sustained 
efforts  of  the  Employment  Service  only  a  small  number  of  their  employment 
vacancies were used within New Deal.  
 
Given  that  an  estimated  70  per  cent  of  these  new  jobs  are  to  be  found  in  small 
business (NEP 2004) and that the Employment Service deal almost exclusively with Effective Intervention 
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small to medium employers  - [<10 employees, 57per cent and 10-250 employees, 
42per cent] (Bunt, McAndrew and Keuchal 2007) this suggests an underexploited 
opportunity  to  bring  together  the  small  business  employer  and  the  New  Deal 
employee.  
 
Even where jobs have been created, difficulties in sustainability arise as many of 
these jobs tend towards the unstable, poorly paid, lacking fringe benefits and offering 
relatively little training. Three out of four of such jobs achieved by the previously 
unemployed are temporary, part time and of a lower skill level than their previous 
occupation  (Clarke  2002;  Kitching  and  Blackburn  2002;  Haughton  2000;  Cosh, 
Duncan and Hughes 1998; Strawn 1998; White and Firth 1998). As such, this type of 
employment does little to address the structural factors that lead to unemployment 
and long term unemployment.  
 
New Deal has not been enough to provide sizeable numbers of vacancies, sustain 
employment for the target groups, nor impact on employment levels in especially 
disadvantaged communities.  
 
Differential Experiences  
Over  the  period  1998-2006  New  Deal  was  the  main  form  of  labour  market 
intervention  for  the  long  term  unemployed,  but  worked  alongside  several  other 
initiatives of similar intent.  
 
Table 5.4 Summary of Main UK Labour Market Interventions 1998-2006 
 
Programme  Date  Scale (Participants) 
New Deal for Young People  1998 -  1,145,000 
New Deal 25+  1998 -   660,000 
New Deal for Lone Parents  1998 -   727,000 
New Deal for Disabled People  2001 -   230,000 
New Deal 50+  2000 -   78,000* 
Employment Zones  2000 -   211,000 
Working Neighbourhoods  2004-2006  20,000 (estimate.) 
Action Team for Jobs     2000-2006  200,000 (estimate) 
City Strategy  2006-2008  300,000 (estimate) 
Pathways to Work   2003 -   110,000 (pilot phase)** 
StepUp  2004-2005  3500 
Employment Retention and Advancement   2003-2006  16500 
* Figures for Jan04 to Nov 06 
**Client group coverage at 2006 - 900,000                                      Source: DWP Tabulation tool 2006 Effective Intervention 
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Developments within the New Deal have attempted to address specific features of 
long  term  unemployment  and  deliver  specialised  assistance  measures  to  address 
these. Their respective structures and outcomes are introduced below.  
 
The New Deal  
 
New Deal for Young People 1998- 
New Deal for Young People (18-24) was the largest aspect of the overall New Deal 
programme,  with  over  1,100,000  participants  between  1998-2006.  Mandatory 
involvement was triggered by an Income Support claim of 6 months or more. This 
led  to  the  appointment  of  a  personal  adviser  who  would  work  with  to  secure 
employment within the initial 4 months Gateway period. After this, referral to one of 
the New Deal options took place.  
 
New Deal for the 25+ 1998- 
Similar in structure to the New Deal for Young People, this option concentrated on 
the older long term unemployed whose access to the labour market may be more 
complicated  due  to  previous  employment  difficulties  and  complex  personal 
circumstances.  
 
New Deal for Lone Parents 1998 -  
This voluntary element of the New Deal was established to improve rates of lone 
parent participation in the labour market. This was based around a work focussed 
interview with benefits claimants setting out a range of alternative options such as in 
work benefits and childcare support. 
 
New Deal for the Disabled 2001 -  
New  Deal  for  the  Disabled  is  a  voluntary  employment  programme  designed  for 
individuals  claiming  Incapacity  Benefit.  The  programme  is  delivered  through  a 
network  of  Job  Brokers  drawn  from  a  mix  of  public,  private,  and  voluntary 
organisations.  
 Effective Intervention 
  86 
New Deal 50+  2000-  
ND 50 + is a voluntary initiative offering return-to-work support through the New 
Deal  programme  for  older  individuals.  On  successfully  attaining  employment, 
individuals were offered continuing support from a personal adviser and could claim 
an employment credit of £40 per week for a maximum of one year.  
 
Outcomes  
The New Deals for disabled, 50+ and lone parent  models lean towards the concept 
of profiling as a more productive form of intervention (Hasluck 2004; McQuaid, 
Greig and Adams 2004). All made good use of personal advisers and each offered 
selective  and  specialised  forms  of  assistance  to  key  target  groups  as  opposed  to 
general models aimed at  broader groups of the unemployed. As such they were more 
successful in their job outcomes and job sustainability than the main mandatory New 
Deals for Young People and the 25+.  
 
Evaluation evidence (Evans, Millar and Sayre 2003) shows that since 1998, more 
than  half  of  participants  in  New  Deal  for  Lone  Parents  have  progressed  into 
employment. Leavers to jobs figures up to 2007 put this employment rate at over 60 
per cent with a sustainable job rate of 48 per cent (Bivand 2006b).  Similar positive 
trends appear evident in the other two programmes. In the New Deal for Disabled 
just over 50 per cent progress into employment and after one year 36 per cent of 
participants were still in work with a further 35 per cent looking for work (Labour 
Market Trends 2005). Similarly, for New Deal 50 plus, 84 per cent of participants 
did not return to claim benefits after participation (Grierson 2002) with almost all 
remaining in employment.    However, low rates of  sustainability (13 weeks +) of 36 
per cent New Deal (Disabled), 32 per cent for the 25+ group and 48 per cent for lone 
parents  raise  the  question  of  whether  more  could  have  been  achieved  with  the 
resources and time invested. Participation is these three programmes (lone parents, 
50+  and  disabled)  was  voluntary  –  suggesting  greater  levels  of  work  motivation 
(Hasluck  and  Green  2007).  The  comparable  rate  for  the  mandatory  New  Deal 
(Young People) was 26 per cent 
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Furthermore, apart from New Deal for Lone Parents , these high rates of success may 
be misleading where the overall rates of activity have been relatively small. In the 
UK at the 2001 census, 14 per cent of the population (8.6 million) were registered as 
disabled. At 2006 there were around 2.6 million Incapacity Benefit recipients with 
around 230,000 of these attending the initial New Deal interview. The figures above 
represent about 70,000 job placements.  
 
For New Deal 50 plus evidence of success is spread over three  years, producing 
around 23,000 job outcomes per year for a target group who have 145,000 claiming 
Jobseekers  Allowance  with  a  further  1,187,000  receiving  Incapacity  Benefit 
(Sainsbury and Davidson 2006). Although this is regarded as an effective way to 
work with this target group, it has been limited in its overall effectiveness by the fact 
that it has only been able to engage with a relatively small number of participants 
 
Increasing the scale of the intervention may improve its effect, however it may also 
be the case that it is operating at its natural level where the reported enthusiasm and 
motivation  of  those  voluntarily  participating  would  not  be  replicated  in  a  larger, 
mandatory version of this. 
 
Overall, jobs gained through all three of these three New Deal models tend to be in 
low  skill/elementary  occupations  with  employers  showing  little  motivation  to 
encourage upskilling through the use of the training grant made available (Needels 
and Schmitz 2006;DWP 2003a; Lakey et al 2002).  
 
Of the evaluation evidence offered (Dutton Et al 2005; Hasluck 2004; McQuaid, 
Greig and Adams 2004; DWP 2003b; Evans, Millar and Sayre 2003; Lakey et al  
2002; Grierson 2002) no specific reference is made to the views of employers in 
dealing with these groups other than their preference not to support any professional 
development through vocational training. This suggests a continuing imbalance of 
interest  towards  the  operational  processes  of  the  New  Deal  as  opposed  to  any 
sustainable effect it may have in supporting employer and employee interests.  It 
further  assumes  that  employers  act  in  a  rational  manner  when  presented  with 
employment  inducements  and  that  these  can  be  applied  successfully  with  only  a Effective Intervention 
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superficial understanding of this. An example of this can be found in the case of 
small  employers  who  struggle  to  cope  with  the  additional  workplace  demands 
created in the employment of the disabled (Needels and Schmitz 2006;Dewson 2005) 
 
In  the  case  of  New  Deal  for  Lone  Parents,  where  volume  has  been  significantly 
higher, participants still experience significant barriers to work mainly in childcare 
and domestic issues emerging to complicate the employment placing (Dutton et al 
2005). Positive outcomes tend to be skewed towards more affluent communities and 
results  for  disadvantaged  areas  are  not  so  encouraging  (Evans,  Millar  and  Sayre 
2003).  
 
Success with the lone parent group has very a very strong resonance with the similar 
success  reported  by  the  Welfare  to  Work  model  in  the  USA  where  the  issue  of 
economic inactivity does not appear to be based around the weak quality of labour, 
but  rather  the  impediment  that  care  responsibilities  present.  Where  adequate 
childcare/personal  care  can  be  provided  this  is  observed  to  free  up  access  to 
employment for this group (Meager 2006; Strawn 1998;Welfare to Work Partnership 
1996).  
 
Some modest improvements in the use of personal advisers and job brokers may 
have  contributed  to  these  improved  success  rates,  however  the  observed 
improvement in sustainable employment over that of the original New Deal model 
may be best explained by the voluntary nature of participation, the motivation of 
participants to work, and the use of childcare as a mechanism to unlock an existing, 
relatively high quality labour reserve of lone parents. Were such models to become 
mandatory it is difficult to see how such high rates of success could be maintained. 
These specialisations of the New Deal can report some positive but quite limited 
general effects.  These limitations may be observed as re-emphasising the enduring 
issue of difficulty in labour market reintegration, effecting sustained employment and 
assisting career progression for these groups. Effective Intervention 
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Initiatives of a Spatial Focus 
Recognising the spatial element to deprivation and economic inactivity as manifested 
in disadvantaged communities (Beatty and Fothergill 1998; Green 1998; Peck 1998; 
Turok and Webster 1998), the development of area-focussed initiatives appears as a 
natural enhancement in supporting the aims of the  New Deal.  Several of the main 
examples  are introduced below. 
 
Employment Zones 2000- 
Employment Zones were established in 2000 to address the enduring issue of long 
term unemployment which, in many  areas, had  proved resistant to the  consistent 
downward  national  trends  in  unemployment.  Fifteen  zones  were  established  to 
provide support services based on a concentrated process of targeted employment 
placings.  These  were  provided  by  a  combination  of  private,  public-private  and 
wholly public providers.  
 
Working Neighbourhoods (pilot) 2004-2006 
Working Neighbourhood pilot sites were deliberately small, having approximately 
6,000 residents per site, where approximately 2,000 people are receipt of working 
age benefits.  This allowed Jobcentreplus and its partner agencies to offer intensive 
help and support to all economically inactive residents (within available resources). 
Issues identified by local residents as inhibiting access to employment were mainly 
in  lack  of  suitable  jobs,  poor  employment  skills,  low  work  motivation  and 
underdeveloped support systems in transport and childcare. 
 
Action Team for Jobs 2000-2006 
Action Team for Jobs was based on voluntary participation and provided an adviser-
led service, located in the local community, to connect with individuals reluctant to 
otherwise engage with Jobcentreplus services. A target of 70 per cent non Jobseekers 
Allowance individuals was set against this. 
 
City Strategy 2006- 
Given that many areas, and communities, within the UKs cities display high rates of 
unemployment and economic inactivity, this initiative aims to increase employment Effective Intervention 
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rates among individuals, tackle child poverty; improve employment rates for single 
parents and increase job retention and advancement. At July 2006, 13 cities in the 
UK were selected after a competitive process. Each strategy is tailored to the specific 
needs of the host city (Branosky 2006) 
 
Outcomes 
All of these approaches recognise that general employment placing measures alone 
can be insufficient for many communities and that more sophisticated and targeted 
approaches are required. However, whilst these address spatial concentration of need, 
their effect in acknowledging and addressing the causes of this high unemployment 
is perhaps not so developed. 
 
The outcomes of the Employment Zone approach produced superior outcomes in 
comparison to the main New Deal and New Deal 25+ models and could report a 
raised unemployment outflow of 4 per cent greater than similar non-Employment 
Zone areas  - 55 per cent of Employment Zone participants had experience of paid 
work over the first 10 months compared to 51 per cent for New Deal 25+ (Hales et 
al. 2003). Whilst many of the jobs secured produced higher sustainability rates than 
similar employment programmes, many did not last into the longer term. Hales et al. 
(2003) found this to be due to the fact that many of the jobs secured were temporary, 
and candidate’s personal factors surfaced to complicate the job placement. In more 
general terms, even after 20 months from eligibility to participate, over half of the 
Employment Zone participants had spent no time in paid work. The emphasis on 
employment related payments to these employment brokers introduced a very strong 
incentive  to  quickly  secure  jobs  for  the  target  group.  This  placed  a  considerable 
emphasis on a simple employment placement focused on the most employable (CPC, 
TERU, MORI 2002).  
 
Working Neighbourhoods sought to proactively engage with the target group and 
accelerate access to New Deal and Employment Zone provision. It appears from the 
work  efforts  with  around  only  one-third  of  participants  successfully  making  this 
transition. 35 per cent of participants had moved into employment in the two years 
up to 2006 – 55 per cent of this for more than 13 weeks and 37 per cent for over 26 Effective Intervention 
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weeks. This is lower than comparable New Deal approaches. It is suggest by Dewson 
et al. (2007) that weak demand side measures frustrated the efforts of this approach. 
 
The Action Team model is built on an approach designed to reach the most difficult 
to engage clients. From its inception to September 2005, Action Teams has helped 
over 150,000 individuals back to work and against the targets set, it appears to have 
been reasonably successful (Casebourne, Davis and Page 2006). This success may be 
due, in part, to the outcome based funding paid to service providers where there has 
been a clear focus on employment rather than on soft skills development.  As was 
witnessed in Employment Zone, this suggests a focus on the most employable and 
that more difficult client groups and individuals may not have been suited to the 
Action Team model. 
 
In  these  examples,  the  social  and  economic  context  is  viewed  as  an  important 
determinant of success and related environmental issues are addressed to varying 
degrees.  However,  there  still  appears  to  be  a  very  heavy  weighting  towards  job 
placement as a simple solution; the targeting of effort at the most employable, a 
heavy  emphasis  on  the  needs  of  the  individual  and  limited  dialogue  with  the 
employer community. All are driven by job targets and related social and economic 
factors  appear  as  temporary  issues  circumvented  rather  than  tackled.  There  is  a 
limited acknowledgment of these causal factors of high long term unemployment.  
 
Their limited long term economic and social effect, at the broader area level, may be 
explained  by  this.  Such  models  do  not  address  the  structural  features  of  high 
unemployment and may be viewed as addressing the symptom rather than the causes 
of this. Several more recent approaches, based on active intervention now seek to do 
this, most notably Pathways to Work. 
 
Active Intervention 
Building from the principles of active labour market policy, several large scale 
interventions have developed. 
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Pathways to Work 2003 -  
Pathways to Work is an attempt to disrupt and reduce the pattern of referral and 
claim for Incapacity Benefit. It is based on an assumption that individuals newly 
referred  as  potential  or  repeat  claimants  may  be  able  to  benefit  from  a  range  of 
alternative work-based options to prevent a long-term pattern of Incapacity Benefit 
support developing. This is a direct acknowledgment of the difficulties faced when 
attempting to redirect existing claimants into employment.  
 
Condition Management  Programmes are recognised as  an essential  aspect of this 
approach as management of the individuals non-vocational circumstances can prove 
just as crucial to success. This would include measures which might relate to mental 
health,  complementary  therapy,  stress  management,  addictions  support  and 
addressing other personal, clinical, welfare benefits and social issues which might 
otherwise frustrate a successful job placement. Given that 40 per cent of Incapacity 
Benefit claimants report mental health issues rather than physical incapacity; this is 
indicative of both a shift in the profile of the average claimant and in the approaches 
developed by Department of Work and Pensions to address this (Barnes and Hudson 
2006; Bivand 2006a) 
 
Intermediate Labour Markets (various dates) 
Intermediate Labour Market projects operate as labour market interventions which 
seek  to  build  from  a  transitional  employment  experience  between  the  most 
disadvantaged  members  of  local  communities  and  local  employers.  Designed  to 
address  complex  personal,  social,  financial  and  vocational  issues,  the  long  term 
preparation for work associated with this model allows the individual to deal with a 
range of issues over a reasonable period of time in advance of full employment. 
These training programmes offer a bridge between unemployment and employment 
and help prevent premature inappropriate job placement and high rates of job drop 
out.  
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Employment Retention and Advancement 2003- 2006 
Conceived  as  the  next  step  in  welfare  reform  and  operating  on  a  demonstration 
project basis from 2003, Employment Retention and Advancement is designed to 
help break the low pay/low skill dimension of employment associated with many 
previous  programmes.  Whereas  many  of  the  methods  introduced,  this  far, 
concentrate on moving individuals from welfare benefit into employment (regardless 
of its sustainability prospects), this approach aims to keep them working longer and 
help them improve their employment value through skills development. This is seen 
very  much  as  a  shift  away  from  short-term  work-first  approaches  which  have 
dominated  in  the  past,  many  of  which  were  viewed  with  some  suspicion  by 
employers due to quality of labour issues.  
 
Outcomes 
These  approaches  acknowledge  the  importance  of  preventing  negative  patterns 
emerging for individuals attempting the return to work, whether this is the Incapacity 
Benefit  trap,  ineffective  and  short  term  employment  placing  or  the  low  skill/low 
wage rut that many entry level jobs can become. 
 
Evidence on the performance of Pathways to Work is encouraging. Early indications 
suggest that it is leading to a reduction in Incapacity Benefit caseload sizes (Blyth 
2006). In effect, individuals are successfully being attracted away from Incapacity 
Benefit.  Blyth (2006) reports the rate of 6 month off flow at around 8 percentage 
points higher in Pathways areas than for control areas (where a national 6 month off 
flow rate of around 30 per cent is evident).  In addition, the rate job entry is around 
twice that of comparison areas – 4.6 per cent  compared to 2.3 per cent (Bivand 
2006a). However it is not certain that this reducing caseload is directly reflected in 
increased levels of employment. Displacement to other benefit, such as Jobseekers 
Allowance, is a real possibility. 
 
Intermediate Labour Market interventions nurture vocational skills in a supportive 
environment prior to job placement. Job outcomes tend to be more expensive than 
direct job placing programmes but report superior outcomes in terms of reduced drop 
out,  improved  job  sustainability,  higher  income  jobs  and  a  stronger  link  to  the Effective Intervention 
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communities  in  which  they  operate  (Bickerstaff  and  Devins  2004).  Many  have 
sought to develop strong positive links with a core group of employers as a means of 
strengthening  the  relevance  of  the  training  experience  and  introducing  some 
proactive employer input to the training programme. This helps to address some of 
the demand side issues which other approaches find difficult to do. 
 
The long-term intensive approach of Employment Retention and Advancement is 
quite  different  from  the  previous  short-term  target  driven  behaviour  of  the  main 
employment agencies. 16,500 participants were engaged in this between 2003 and 
2005 with their progress tracked beyond this (Hall et al. 2005). This approach seeks 
to engage with the employer as a partner, identifying employer concerns as valid and 
equal to employee issues. Early evaluation evidence (Dorset Et al 2007) shows some 
developing patterns where participants in this initiative are beginning to earn higher 
wages than the control group but that this modest success is limited mainly through 
early difficulties in fully engaging with historic support mechanisms; still driven by a 
job outputs culture 
 
These  approaches  make  some  limited  move  away  from  the  dominant  participant 
needs led and employment outcome focussed approach of the other main measures 
discussed.  It suggests a shift away from  a reactive programme of unemployment 
reduction to one which adopts a more rounded perspective to the causes and effects 
of unemployment. In this, there is recognition of preventative action, personal and 
professional development and critically, the potential of employers as equal partners 
and  guarantors  of  success  for  many  of  the  job  placements  secured.  Given  the 
structural  level  issues  and  prevailing  cultures  of  the  agencies  involved  this 
nonetheless  suggests  a  modest  move  towards  some  greater  interpretation  and 
planning based on employment demand factors. 
 
Prevocational Intervention 
Many individuals will be unsuited to the types of initiative introduced above. For 
them, their distance from successful labour market activity will be considerable. This 
may be due to serious addictions, mental health, homelessness, motivational issues or 
a simple reluctance to disengage from a long term benefits dependency. For these Effective Intervention 
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individuals,  there  is  little  merit  in  introducing  them  to  employers.  Indeed,  this 
inappropriate type of referral this was one of the central criticisms of New Deal from 
the employer survey undertaken. Instead, programmes designed to prepare the basic 
personal circumstances of the individual have been attempted as an initial form of 
intervention and preparation prior to referral to more vocational programmes. Such 
approaches are felt to offer a more realistic primary form of engagement for many 
complex cases and help reduce inappropriate, unsuccessful and wasteful employment 
placings 
 
Complementary Programmes 
Labour market interventions are not the exclusive reserve of the Department of Work 
and Pensions and its partners. This is a very complicated and crowded arena with 
many  players  involved,  each  with  their  own  specific,  thematic  and  geographic 
outcomes in mind. Such projects have been developed, funded and delivered by a 
broad range of statutory, voluntary and private sector organisations. Projects which 
have co-existed with the main interventions have included those aimed at minority 
groups, disadvantaged communities, sectoral skills shortage areas and employment 
initiatives tied to physical regeneration projects.  
 
Enabling Approaches  
Finally,  we  have  previously  seen  how  the  UK  Government  is  interested  in  both 
welfare  reform  and  increased  labour  market  participation.  Alongside  these  direct 
vocational  intervention  programmes  introduced  above,  there  are  also  a  series  of 
enabling and facilitating measures which have been introduced in an effort to ‘Make 
Work  Pay’  and  help  tackle  the  issue  of  reservation  wage  and  marginal  income 
benefit. The two largest of these have been the introduction of tax credits and a 
national minimum wage. 
 
Tax credits offer varying degrees of attractiveness for the individual, however in 
common with other measures of similar intent there appears to be enduring issues of 
employment quality. At this volatile, below average wage end of the labour market, 
minimum wage jobs are of relatively short duration and tend towards low skill and 
low pay. Further, there is no evidence to show that such jobs act as stepping stones to Effective Intervention 
  96 
higher paid jobs. Low pay is not a transient experience and workers in this bracket 
tend to remain in this type of employment (Bivand 2005; JRF 2004; Bennet and 
Hirsch 2001; Boheim and Taylor (2000); Layard 1998; Taylor 1998) 
 
Nearly a quarter of UK employees remain in low paid employment, a rate almost 
unchanged since the introduction of the minimum wage. The rate of low paid as a 
percentage of all UK employees’ shows signs of increasing rather than decreasing 
NPI (2004) with these workers concentrated in the retail, health/social care, hotels 
and catering and miscellaneous services sectors.   NPI define the low pay threshold 
as household income which keeps the worker and their dependents free of poverty 
without means tested support. At publication (NPI 2004) they estimate this to be in 
the region of £6 to £7 per hour (estimated on full time working) – adult minimum 
wage in 2004 was £4.85 per hour.  
 
The Working Families Tax Credit and the Employment Tax Credit may increase the 
incentive  to  work,  however  they  may  also  act  to  restrict  labour  supply  as 
economically  inactive  couples  will  receive  the  highest  reward  if  only  one  is  in 
employment. A joint income will reduce credit eligibility and might possibly make 
employment economically unattractive (Bennet and Hirsch 2001). 
 
From this we may observe the limits of a minimum wage policy as of relatively small 
effect, producing relatively small wage increases within an overall environment of 
high turnover, low paid, low skill, and insecure employment. At best it may have 
curbed the excesses of the UKs worst employers while for many it can be viewed 
reinforcing a low wage, low skills culture, subsidising employers to pay less then a 
living wage. 
 
These projects may exist entirely independently, as combination approaches or as 
complementary partnerships. They may rely on funding from many sources. Taken 
together they represent a significant volume of activity, which seeks to complement, 
and in many cases improve, the larger programmes discussed earlier.  
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Demand Assumptions 
For  New  Deal  the  principal  measure  of  success  is  employment.  Storey  (1998) 
observes that small businesses, as the largest creators of employment opportunity, 
may have been expected to provide much of this.  
 
The New Deal set out to tackle long term unemployment, found particularly in areas 
of  weak  market  activity  and  high  benefits  dependency.  Such  intent  relies  on  an 
accompanying increase in the availability and quality of jobs available within the 
economy.  For  long-term  effect,  it  will  also  depend  for  its  success  in  helping  to 
improve the sustainability of these jobs for the individuals employed in them.  
 
This approach has not taken real account of account of the demand side structural 
causes of unemployment – i.e. the strength of the local community economy upon 
which any jobs related strategy must rest. Through employment led measures such as 
the  New  Deal,  disadvantaged  areas  have  seen  very  limited  gain  in  employment 
volume, quality and sustainability; evidenced by the persistence of unemployment 
and poverty despite repeated interventions. (Fothergill 2001; Haughton 2000; Green 
1998; Brown and Sessions 1996). 
 
There is an immediate issue of poor demand and weak supply in the areas where 
these  interventions  are  concentrated.  The  complexity  of  the  social  and  economic 
issues, the weakness of the community infrastructures, poor quality of labour  and the 
failure of the market to provide employment opportunities compound to present a 
very difficult working environment.  Market based approaches in weak market areas 
will, by definition, find it difficult to succeed (Green 1998b). In this, it is unrealistic 
to base an employment strategy on an expectation that the local small business base 
will engage at a meaningful scale. Here the fundamental design of a labour market 
intervention drawn to areas of high long term unemployment is weakened by the 
incapacity of these areas to provide sufficient, sustainable employment opportunities. 
Interventions following the New Deal must appreciate these difficulties more fully 
and adopt a programme design which accounts for these.  Effective Intervention 
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Enhanced and Refocused Interventions 
The New Deal has relied on the use of wage subsidies for employers. Many of the 
supporting initiatives, designed to improve access to New Deal will also work in this 
way. Employment Zone, Step-up, Action Team for Jobs and Pathways to Work have 
all made use of these.  
 
The  wage  subsidy  approach  persists  despite  the  concerns  expressed  over  its 
attractiveness to employers and the success evidenced by alternative interventions 
offering different inducements and support measures. In the recruitment of the long 
term unemployed, employers appear to respond as much to intervention stressing 
employee support and aftercare as wage subsidy. This would tend to confirm the 
business survey findings that many other issues come before the availability of wage 
subsidy  in  the  decision  to  recruit.  The  original  New  Deal  model  may  have 
understated this and had its effectiveness impaired as a result. 
 
Efficient Use of Resources – Beyond Wage Subsidies 
Jobs  realised  through  wage  subsidies  alone  do  not  create  much  in  the  way  of 
additional  employment,  are  low  skill/low  pay/poor  prospects  and  generally  short 
term in nature. In terms of economic investment, where these jobs can be achieved, 
they are not a springboard to much more. People who enter low skill jobs without 
current  or  appropriate  qualifications  are  unlikely  to  gain  them  during  or,  more 
tellingly,  as  a  result  of  their  job  occupancy  (Brace  2005;  Holzer  2004).  Cyclical 
individual  employment  tenures  may  persist  in  these  labour  markets  where 
employment  status  is  highly  dependent  on  vulnerable  and  unstable  employment 
conditions. (Labour Market Trends 2003) 
 
Such high rates of wastage are clearly not value for money in terms of the effort 
invested and may only reinforce low skills equilibrium at the community level. The 
employment effects of measures intended to stimulate the recruitment of the long 
term unemployed and other vulnerable groups in the labour market generally tend to 
be lower than even the most pessimistic predictions of most theoretical models and 
simulations. In his review of European and North American job subsidy schemes 
Marx  (2005)  found  that  subsidised  schemes  do  not  appear  to  have  a  significant Effective Intervention 
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positive effect on the employment chances of  beneficiaries in the regular labour 
market.  
 
Further to this, wage subsidy models may only become attractive to employers if 
they are able to enhance the wage subsidy with complementary business focussed 
support measures which include vocational development activities for the employee 
(Marx  2005;  Atkinson and  Williams  2003  and  Katz  1998).  It  is  evident  that  the 
benefits  of  a  subsidy  alone  are  insufficient  to  support  meaningful,  sustainable 
individual progress. 
 
Cockx et al. (1998) stress the significance of active labour market policies which 
perceive  training  as  an  intrinsic  part  of  the  programme  approach.  These  return  a 
better performance in job tenure terms than the simpler wage subsidy. This provides 
support  for  a  developing  human  capital  theory  as  opposed  to  the  more  basic 
employment matching theories which have driven many employment programmes on 
the UK to date. Targeted training adds significant strength to job security. (Brace 
2005; Holzer 2004). Recruitment opportunities and sustainable employment for the 
economically inactive are only likely to improve when workforce development and 
advancement is provided alongside personal support (Newton et al. 2005). This view 
is reinforced by Katz (1998) and Atkinson and Williams (2003), who observe that 
employment  subsidy  schemes  only,  work  in  combination  with  counselling  and 
vocational training as a support to retention and advancement. This entails working 
with  both  the  supply  and  demand  sides  to  ensure  a  stronger  recognition  of  their 
mutual interests and to avoid the design of intervention models which concentrate 
primarily on labour supply without fully understanding or appreciating the nature of 
demand. It may be a more efficient use of resource to divert wage subsidy funds into 
stronger employer/employee support services. These employment support services 
must then be couched in broader economic and social regeneration terms.  
 
In almost all of the New Deal interventions introduced earlier, the emphasis is clearly 
on the supply side and the needs of the unemployed individual in the transition to 
work. Employer involvement in initiative design and operations has been generally 
limited  (Coleman  2007;Hasluck  and  Green  2007).  However  examples  of  a  more Effective Intervention 
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balanced  employer  influence  on  intervention  design,  in  some  cases,  may  be  the 
beginning  of  a  trend  towards  full  partnership  working  between  the  supply  and 
demand sides. It is clear that refinements of approach are being made in light of New 
Deal experiences; however, many of these initiatives are developed only as small 
scale pilot measures. The true test of service development and refinement will be 
evidenced in how far their most effective features can be mainstreamed within future 
practice. 
 
Structural Level Changes 
The Employment Service (1998) intended that the New Deal initiative in the UK 
would  contribute  to  an  increase  in  the  sustainable  level  of  employment  and  a 
reduction in social exclusion by helping long term unemployed people and other 
marginal  groups  into  jobs.  In  this  time  there  has  been  an  increase  in  the  UK 
workforce and a significant drop in the numbers of unemployed. However, alongside 
this remain persistently high rates of unemployment and economic inactivity which 
might be further reduced.  
 
The UK Government has adopted a  range of  measures to encourage the  greatest 
possible  employment  rate  (HMSO  2001).  In  working  towards  an  80  per  cent 
employment  rate  target  a  number  of  new  labour  market  interventions  may  be 
required  to  make  it  more  likely  that  employers  will  recruit  from  the  long  term 
unemployed  and  individuals  in  receipt  of  related  long  term  welfare  benefits; 
principally Incapacity Benefit. Towards this, the original New Deal model requires 
refreshment, refocusing, enhancement, extension and improvement. 
 
The Government has set out to build on the early experiences of New Deal through 
developing  a  range  of  intervention  types  which  may  more  accurately  reflect  the 
needs of the target group and the communities in which they live. Driving this has 
been a process of institutional reform. 
 
The  push  from  central  Government  to  modernise  the  relationship  between  the 
benefits system and employment represents a decisive shift away from passive to 
active labour markets. Towards this, the uniform nature of national structures has Effective Intervention 
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begun to break down into smaller, more sensitive and localised services, helping to 
redefine the relationship between service providers and individuals. 
 
Many new initiatives have been introduced alongside this, either as a specialisation 
of, or complement to the New Deal approach. Large Government departments are 
now expected to work in innovative partnerships with many other types of voluntary 
and  statutory  organisations  and  the  public  sector  monopoly  in  the  delivery  of 
employment and training services is being dismantled and replaced by a new mixed 
market  (Bivand  2006b).  These  have  shown  the  value  of  greater  flexibility  and 
focussing of approach in order to address localised, complex and variable factors 
which influence economic inactivity at the community level.  
 
This  is  supporting  greater  coherence  between  welfare  and  employment  and  has 
helped to develop a range of preventative measures which seek to reduce economic 
inactivity in favour of alternative labour market based measures. These developments 
are resulting in changes in working practices, new referral and attendance procedures 
for clients and the development of new aids to help secure employment. 
 
Interventions Development 
It  is  apparent  that  from  the  introduction  of  the  New  Deal  in  1998,  interventions 
designed to engage and work the main target group have improved. The main New 
Deal  approaches  have  continued  in  the  use  of  wage  subsidy  as  the  principal 
instrument  of  attraction  for  employers.  These  have  been  New  Deal  for  Disabled 
People, New Deal for Lone Parents, New Deal 50+. However, many of the other 
initiatives  introduced  are  not  based  around  such  subsidies  but  on  proactive  and 
managed relationships brokered between employers and the unemployed by a range 
of specialist intermediary mechanisms operating thematically or geographically. This 
suggests that the availability of employment support services as an alternative to the 
simple financial attraction of a wage subsidy may be as, if not more important, to 
employers in the process of deciding to recruit the previously unemployed (Dewson, 
Richie and Meager 2005) Effective Intervention 
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The  following  table  summarises  the  main  developments  in  labour  market 
intervention  since  the  introduction  of  the  New  Deal  and  suggests  a  number  of 
developing trends in these. 
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Table 5.6 Labour Market Intervention Initiatives Following From New Deal 
 
 
 
 
Note. IS=Income Support; JSA=Jobseekers Allowance; IB=Incapacity Benefit 
Programme  Partner 
Base 
Fund 
Flexibility 
Mandatory  Use of wage 
subsidy 
PA 
based 
Preventative  Client 
Focus 
Outreach  Area focus  Year  
Employment 
Zones 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Possible  Yes  No  JSA  No  Yes  2000- 
Action Team for 
Jobs 
Yes  Yes  No  Possible  Yes  No  JSA/ 
IB 
Yes  Yes  2000-
2006 
Pathways to Work  Yes  Yes  No  Possible  Yes  No  JSA/ 
IB/IS 
Yes  Yes   
New Deal for 
Disabled People 
Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  IB  No  No  1998- 
New Deal for Lone 
Parents 
No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  JSA/ 
IS/IB 
No  No  1998- 
New Deal 50+  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  JSA/ 
IB 
No  No  1998- 
Employment 
Retention  
Advancement 
Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  JSA/ 
IB/ 
IS 
No  No  2003- 
Pathways to Work  
 
Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  IB  No  Possible  2003- 
Working 
Neighbourhoods 
Yes  Yes  No  Possible  Yes  No  JSA/ 
IB/IS 
Yes  Yes  2004-
2006 
City Strategy  Yes  Yes  Possible  Possible  Yes  Possible  JSA/ 
IB/IS 
Yes  Yes  2006-
2008 
Flexible New Deal   Yes  Yes  Yes  Possible  Yes  Yes  JSA/IS  Yes  No  2008- 
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These  support  services  have  been  based  around  geographic  and  thematic 
specialisation of employment support, the use of small discretionary flexible funds, 
outreach and proactive engagement with the target group, prevocational and aftercare 
support, support with benefits and housing issues, coherent and co-ordinated multi 
agency support,  greater  use of sanction, workforce development  and preventative 
intervention.  Together  these  are  beginning  to  address  many  of  the  complex  and 
variable issues which disrupt or ruin the return to work process for the long term 
unemployed.  
 
Such approaches recognise and more accurately reflect social and economic needs in 
such  communities.  However,  these  represent  modest  progress  in  addressing  the 
stated  concerns  of  the  small  business  employer  and  should  be  regarded  as 
foundations for future development; core components of a more sensitive mechanism 
linking  together  the  long  term  unemployed  and  the  employment  opportunities 
presented by small business. The following chapter picks up on these developments 
and offers some considerations as to how these might be consolidated and developed 
within a more sophisticated support framework.  Considerations for Future Practice  
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CHAPTER 6 CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE PRACTICE  
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CONCLUSION  
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Learning from New Deal.  
Much effort has been invested in the volume of New Deal referrals made and the 
sheer numbers of individuals involved. Set against this,  is an experience of difficult 
to place individuals, reluctant and disenchanted employers and fragile employment 
placements. To many involved, it appears that New Deal has been more a numbers 
game  than  a  serious  attempt  to  deal  with  the  issues  of  long  term  unemployment 
through  a  partnership  with  local  employers.  However,  despite  its  limitations  the 
overall  New  Deal  experience  has  left  in  place  some  strong  foundations  for  the 
development of more effective future practice.  
 
Government proposals to strengthen the return to work process for the long term 
unemployed are reflected in the model of the Flexible New Deal. This will replace 
the current, separate New Deals for young people and unemployed adults, including 
Employment  Zones  and  private  sector  led  New  Deals  and  will  be  delivered  in 
partnership with public, private and voluntary sector contractors (DWP 2007). The 
new programme will provide increasing levels of support with increasing duration of 
unemployment  benefit    claim  with  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  requirements 
placed upon benefits claimants.  
 
The flexible New Deal will modernise and streamline the existing New Deals to 
provide  greater  flexibility  and  more  personalised  support  for  people  of  all  ages 
seeking employment, including self-employment. The key elements of this approach 
are: 
 
•  Jobcentre Plus to lead jobsearch for the first 6 to 12 months; 
•  A Gateway stage, common to everyone and building on the current New Deal 
gateways, leading to more intense jobsearch activity and skills assessment, with 
the most disadvantaged people being fast-tracked to this stage from the outset 
and all others entering after six months; 
•  People  still  looking  for  work  after  the  Gateway  period  to  be  referred  to  a 
specialist provider 
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The model for the flexible New Deal accepts Employment Service limitations and 
welcomes the significant complementary support that can be provided by specialist 
providers  from  other  sectors.  Underpinning  all  of  this  is  the  recognition  that  the 
many  long  term  unemployed  people  require  more  structured,  longer  term 
employment pathways prior to job placement. This more sophisticated view of the 
return  to  work  process  is  informed  by  the  weaknesses  of  the  original  New  Deal 
model  and,  considers  a  series  of  critical  success  factors  other  than  simple  job 
placement. Here, a strong emphasis on preventing unemployment, targeting services, 
developing alternative job information channels, providing skills training, placement 
aftercare  and  a  more  supportive  dialogue  with  employers  all  contribute  to  the 
process.  This  more  rounded  effort  starts  to  address  the  concerns  expressed  by 
employers  and  should  provide  the  platform  for  a  more  successful  programme  of 
interventions.  It  will  help  to  introduce  a  broader  range  of  support  services  from 
specialist providers and contribute to the development of employment interventions, 
including the flexible New Deal model, more attuned to the needs of employers and 
prospective employees. The key elements of this are introduced below.  
 
Employment Pathways 
Employment  and  employability  programmes  must  account  for  many  ingrained, 
structural  issues  which  complicate  the  return  to  work  for  many  individuals. 
Developments  in  employment  interventions,  from  the  New  Deal,  increasingly 
appreciate the complexity of the return to work process; reflected in greater design 
sophistication. The following themes are emerging as common considerations within 
the flexible New Deal model and related measures.  
 
Profiling 
Researching the qualities of the prospective employee and the requirements of the 
business  will  set  in  place  a  New  Deal  approach  of  added  value.  Improving  the 
referral process for prospective employees directly addresses the issue of wastage 
associated  with  high  candidate  turnover  and  low  job  sustainability,  helps  use 
resources  more  intelligently  and  efficiently  and  reduces  employer  risk.  Sharper 
focussing of resources and a more intensive matching process will help to overcome 
employer  reluctance to engage.  Considerations for Future Practice  
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Profiling individuals and business and targeting interventions from an informed and 
negotiated perspective will help to successfully tackle the enduring difficulties which 
arise from a general application of employment interventions (McQuaid, Greig and 
Adams 2004). Designing subsidies specifically for very difficult groups and assisting 
employers in working with this will not be a ready solution for every problem thrown 
up in such complex cases. However, Hasluck (2004) finds persuasive early evidence 
from  the  USA  and  UK  that  in  some  cases  such  an  approach  can  both  be  more 
effective and efficient than those of previous intervention models. 
 
Information Channels  
Functional communities tend to have good word of mouth and formal information 
channels.  Less advantaged communities less so. This reintroduces the  concept of 
social capital as an integral part of any employment based initiative. Where social 
capital is weak, intermediary  agencies may try  to compensate.  However word of 
mouth remains a critical success factor in employment terms; especially so in this 
context  where  small  businesses  rely  on  such  networks  as  the  main  form  of 
recruitment. Without access to information and the knowledge that these networks 
deliver, individuals can be effectively shut out of the labour market (McQuaid, Greig 
and Adams 2004). The broader use of partner agencies as part of the Flexible New 
Deal delivery structure should help support a stronger information partnership with 
employers  and  the  local  community  and  should  generate  an  improvement  in  the 
number of job vacancies notified. The role of the Personal Adviser in supporting 
these channels will prove beneficial.  
 
Preventative Outreach 
The  importance  of  preventing  individuals  from  entering  unemployment  and 
economic inactivity is acknowledged as of critical importance. The Department of 
Work and Pensions and its partner agencies are now more astute at intercepting and 
redirecting  individuals  who  might  otherwise  have  entered  long  term  economic 
inactivity.  Over  the  longer  term,  it  is  anticipated  that  such  approaches  will  help 
fundamentally reshape patterns of welfare dependence and workforce rates in the 
UK. 
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Target Groups 
We have seen that the long-term unemployed are a small subset of the unemployed  
and  economically  inactive  within  a  given  area.  The  original  New  Deal  approach 
draws from a very narrow base and missed many other excluded groups, in particular 
those receiving Incapacity Benefit. Wider regeneration effort is compromised by this. 
As part of a broader welfare reform agenda, future approaches will adopt a more 
intelligent  analysis  of  community  level  economic  and  social  issues,  where  are 
regarded as contributing factors to long term unemployment and economic inactivity. 
Here  the  innovative  features  of  the  Flexible  New  Deal,  alongside  related 
interventions, will work across a variety of target groups and delivery structures.  
 
Skills Training  
The  use  of  VQ  accredited  training  within  the  original  New  Deal  appears  was 
underdeveloped and offered little benefit in terms of transferable skills, improved 
labour  market  mobility  and  in  strengthening  job  retention  rates.  Upskilling  and 
vocational qualifications appeared a difficult concept for the average small business 
DWP (2004). Adapting business function to suit the training needs of the New Deal 
was an unattractive proposition; and as such career development and employment 
progression were not as developed as they could be. Where small businesses did 
engage with the New Deal they did so according to their normal working practices. 
Where this did not fit, New Deal involvement was rejected.  
 
Lack of skills is identified as the main barrier to sustained employment for the long 
term unemployed (Hasluck 2006). The only decrease in labour market participation 
over the last 10 years rates have been the unskilled (Bivand 2006).  Increasing the 
stock of working age people with higher level vocational skills and introducing the 
non skilled to the labour market through training based access will be of crucial 
importance to future economic and social success (Leitch Report 2006). Recruitment 
opportunities  for  the  unemployed  are  likely  to  improve  only  where  workforce 
development and enhancement is introduced to support lower skill vacancies (Leitch 
Report 2006; Hogarth and Wilson 2003) 
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Although training is important, the manner in which it is developed, implemented 
and focussed appears a critical factor of success (Holzer 2004; Cockx et al. 1998). 
Greater  planning  and  employer  consultation  may  help  to  embed  training  as  a 
valuable  part  of  the  overall  approach.  The  relationship  between  the  long  term 
unemployed individual and the employer can be cemented by the introduction of a 
skills based development programme, which increases the value of the employee in 
the workplace and, in theory, makes them less expendable (Marx 2005; Atkinson and 
Williams 2003; Katz 1998; Cockx et al. 1998). Employers are less demanding of 
specific technical skills if candidates exhibit employability and soft skills (Hogarth 
and Wilson 2003). These skills will follow if the individual is right for the business. 
It  is  these  very  core  skills  that  employers  report  as  lacking  in  the  New  Deal 
candidate.  
 
Employer training pilots, established in 2002, set out to test the effect of an offer of 
VQ2 level training for low skilled workers – together with wage compensation to 
employers for the time taken off and direct training costs. Participating employers 
were less interested in the compensation on offer and more interested in training 
linked to business needs and the support of a business adviser (Hillage 2005). This 
brokered service analysed the skills need of the business and the personal qualities of 
the individual before providing a measured match of mutual benefit. Embedding an 
individual  with  skills  potential  within  a  business  helps  improve  employment 
sustainability and reduce job drop out rates. Further, it raises the profile and value of 
training  in  the  business  community  (Dearden  2005;  Hillage  2005).  The  offer  of 
flexibly  delivered,  Government  funded  VQ  level  2  training  in  priority  sectors 
through the ‘Train2gain’ initiative offers evidence of new, more progressive thinking 
in this regard.  
 
A more considered, selective and intelligent approach to training within a revised 
New  Deal  should  help  to  improve  its  value  and  credibility  within  the  business 
community.  
 
 
 Considerations for Future Practice  
  111 
Flexible Fund. Local Discretion. Area Focus 
Small,  flexible  and  personalised  support  services  can  go  far  in  preventing  small 
issues  developing  as  serious  impediments  to  labour  market  participation.  This 
provision  is  becoming  more  common  in  intervention  programme  design.  This 
discretion reflects new  partnership models and  operational flexibility, recognising 
that  large  scale  centralised  and  rigid  programme  design  cannot  account  for  very 
specific localised factors.  
 
Aftercare 
The provision of aftercare recognises the importance of job sustainability as offering 
social  and  economic  stability,  providing  a  strong  platform  for  professional 
development,  upskilling  and  increasing  individual  labour  value.  Ongoing  support 
service  can  prove  valuable  to  employer  and  the  employee.  This  helps  to  prevent 
avoidable  job  drop  out,  improves  longer-term  outcomes  and  ultimately  increases 
efficiency and effectiveness in labour market interventions. The role of a dedicated 
personal adviser appears as central to this. Most intervention programmes stemming 
from the New Deal now recognise the importance of this. 
 
Employers as Full Partners 
In the original New Deal model, employer goodwill was taken for granted. This has 
been a missed opportunity, or an opportunity squandered.  In relative terms, little 
consideration was given to stated business needs whilst much was given to the needs 
of the individuals with whom they were expected to work with, develop and employ.  
 
The initial interest and goodwill of the employer community could not be captured 
through fragmented and incoherent policy and practice which offered little by way of 
true partnership. The attempted implementation of public policy through the vehicle 
of the private sector employer raised a series of incompatible issues and in the end 
little business benefit or community level effect was evident.  
 
The features of a strong employment intervention programme, suggested above, are 
welcome  developments  but,  in  many  cases,  will    require  further  development  in 
proving attractive to employers. Greater consideration of employer need is critical in Considerations for Future Practice  
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any future employment intervention model informed by the experiences of the New 
Deal (ERS 2005). 
 
Understanding Business Behaviour  
Small  business  are  sensitive,  fragile    and  sophisticated  organisations  whose 
behaviour is affected by a large range of external and internal factors which hold 
more  influence  over  the  decision  to  recruit  than  the  crude  attraction  of  a  wage 
subsidy.  Small business employers consistently report that such subsidies are of little 
benefit as stand alone interventions.  
 
Where private business influence has been apparent on the design and operation of 
the New Deal model, it has been mainly through organisations such as Welfare to 
Work  Coalition  or  Employer  Forum.  Some  representation  from  small  business 
groups may be evident (perhaps through the Federation of Small Business or local 
Chamber of Commerce) but in the main design level discussions are dominated by 
larger business and public sector organisations. Given the scale of their employment 
potential , the  voice of the small business is relatively weak here. 
 
Future interventions based on the New Deal experiences should learn more about the 
behaviour of these small businesses, what they favour in terms of support services, 
how their development and employment growth can be assisted and how the central 
business function can be protected and enhanced during this process. Without this 
attention to detail, it is likely that future interventions will be received  with similar 
suspicion  and  indifference.  This  underlines  the  central  importance  of  strong  and 
meaningful employer partnerships running from the design to the operational stages. 
Understanding  small  business  needs  by  sector,  size,  location  and  a  host  of  other 
factors may then help anticipate how best they will respond and cooperate.  
 
Conclusion  
Tackling  unemployment  through  an  interventions  structure  which  assumes  a 
simplistic relationship between the skills requirements of the small business and the 
vocational qualities of the unemployed is unrealistic. This is especially so in the case 
of  the  small  business  whose  specific  needs  and  operational  sensitivities  require Considerations for Future Practice  
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sophisticated support measures. The Employment Service deal almost entirely with 
small businesses yet very few of the vacancies processed were converted to New 
Deal  opportunities.  The  simple  job  matching  measures  that  New  Deal  delivered 
appeared crude in concept and limited in effect.  
 
New Deal has not positively influenced the recruitment practices of small business in 
favour of the long term unemployed. From this experience it can be said that small 
business is not an appropriate vehicle through which to tackle unemployment. For 
this to occur successfully a new model of engagement is required; one built from 
strong employer dialogue and demand sensitive support structures.   
 
The  strength  of  the  employer/employee  relationship  is  based  on  the  value  of  the 
employee. Where this can be enhanced through; better identification, prevocational 
preparation,  skills  development,  aftercare  and  vocational  progression,  employee 
value increases and job tenure improves. Many features emerging from recent UK 
practice  now  recognise  this  and  are  evident  in  Employment  Retention  and 
Advancement,  Train2gain,  StepUp,  Intermediate  Labour  Markets,  Action  Team, 
Employer Training Pilots and Condition Management programmes.  
 
The strong relationship encouraged by these integrated measures, in turn, improves 
the relationship between employers and employment support agents and contributes 
to an approach more in keeping with human capital than employment theory. Such 
approaches  can  extend  further  into  supporting  the  key  tenets  of  employability 
identified as weakly supported by the New Deal; assets, deployment, presentation 
and circumstances (Hillage and Pollard 1999). 
 
We have seen that lightly resourced, market driven interventions may only be of 
temporary  effect  and  offer  little  in  terms  of  structural,  long-term  employment 
opportunity in partnership with the employer community. Investment in longer term, 
sophisticated and intensive forms of employment intervention are likely to provide 
the quality required by small business. There are some early encouraging signs that 
this is now acknowledged in policy. However, until further progress is made towards 
this, and qualitative improvement becomes evident, small businesses are unlikely to Considerations for Future Practice  
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present as a straightforward employment destination for labour market interventions 
working with the unemployed  
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